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NOTE
THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL POWER
OVER THE STATES: THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AND PENNHURST H
The eleventh amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State."' The language of the amendment is precise, and closely parallels that of
the grant of federal judicial power in article III. 2 The interpretation of the eleventh
amendment, however, has been one of the most confused and least understood areas of
constitutional laws Despite its precise language, the eleventh amendment has been
interpreted to extend beyond its literal terms, 4 and has been held to represent broad
principles of federalism and state sovereign immunity. 5 While recognizing that the elev-
enth amendment represents some type of restraint on the power of the federal judiciary
over the states, the United States Supreme Court has never clarified the exact nature of
that restraint. 6 One commentator would limit the eleventh amendment to the assertion
that article III did not abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.? Other commen-
tators assert that the eleventh amendment operates solely as a check on the power of
U.S. CONST. amend. Xl.
2 "The judicial Power shall extend ... to Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of
another State ... and between a State and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2.
See, e.g., Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of
an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033,
1033 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher, Historical Interpretation]; Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Cows'. L. Rev. 1889, 1890 (1983).
4 See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (federal court may not hear suit against
a state by a foreign state, even though terms of eleventh amendment only bar suit by citizens of a
foreign state); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (federal court may not hear suit against a state
by its own citizens, even though terms of eleventh amendment only bar suit by citizens of a different
state).
See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 117 (1984) ("Eleventh
Amendment's basis in federalism"); id. at 140 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Eleventh Amendment ...
exemplified the broader and more ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity"); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 691 (1978) ("principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine").
6 The eleventh amendment is treated as a restriction of federal court subject matter jurisdiction
in allowing an eleventh amendment challenge to be raised for the first time on appeal. See Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). Unlike a jurisdictional bar, however, states may consent to suits
which the eleventh amendment would otherwise prohibit. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(1883); see also Parden v. Terminal Ry. of the Alabama State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)
(state waived immunity by engaging in activity regulated by Congress).
Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L.
Rev. 515, 549 (1977); see infra note 60.
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the federal courts to take jurisdiction over suits against states, leaving Congress free to
extend federal court jurisdiction and abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states.°
Finally, another commentator asserts that the eleventh amendment only removes state-
citizea diversity from the jurisdiction of the federal courts, arguing for separate analysis
of general restraints on federal government power over the states.° Despite the important
differences between these interpretations of the reach of the eleventh amendment, the
Court has not settled on an interpretation of the eleventh amendment which defines its
reach.'°
The Court has generally agreed that the eleventh amendment was adopted to
overturn a decision by the Supreme Court asserting jurisdiction over a suit against a
state by a citizen of another state." How far beyond that particular result the eleventh
amendment reaches, however, is unclear. Although the Supreme Court has imposed the
amendment's bar in cases falling outside its literal language,t 2 in other cases the Court
has limited the amendment's reach. For example, the eleventh amendment is not a bar
to suit in federal court against state officials for torts," or for violations of the federal
Constitution." In a suit against a state official for violating the Constitution, the federal
courts employ a legal fiction that the official's conduct is no longer in an official capacity. 15
Instead, this fiction holds that unconstitutional conduct strips the state official of any
official or representative character, and subjects the official as an individual to suit. 16
While this fiction may bear little relation to reality in state violations of individual
constitutional rights, the Court steadfastly employs this fiction as a primary means of
controlling state violations of the Constitution.' 7
This legal fiction has thus prevented the broad application of the eleventh amend-
ment from depriving the federal courts of the ability to enforce the Constitution against
encroachments by the states. This fiction has not, however, completely displaced the
immunity extended to the state. The Court continues to consider whether the suit is, in
fact, against the state.'s Furthermore, even where suit against a state official is allowed,
the eleventh amendment limits the remedies available. 1 °
8 See Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments
and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 CoLum. L. REV. 1413, 1440-41 (1975);
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues
in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693 (1976). See infra notes 303-10 and
accompanying text.
9 See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1130. See infra notes 68-70, 296-302 and
accompanying text.
l° See infra notes 312-38 and accompanying text.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890). See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
12 See supra note 4 and cases cited therein.
18 See, e.g., Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918) (suit permitted against State Bank
Commissioner for negligent failure in performing duties); Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College
of South Carolina, 221 U.S. 636 (1911) (suit permitted against State Agricultural College for trespass
to private property); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (action in ejectment permitted against
state officials).
' 4 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908). See infra notes 103-22 and accompanying
text.
' 5 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
16 Id.
' 7
 See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964).
18 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
19 Damages which will not come from the state official individually, but rather from the state,
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For most of its history, the eleventh amendment has generally been ignored. 2° In
recent years, however, the amendment has received renewed interest. A recent series of
cases, decided by the Supreme Court by slim majorities, are difficult to reconcile on the
basis of the eleventh amendment doctrines they espouse. 21 Instead, it appears either that
the eleventh amendment means different things in different settings, or that the doc-
trines and fictions do not represent the true bases for the Court's decisions. 22
Against this background, in 1984 the Court decided Pennhurst State School & Hospital
v. Haldeman." In a five to four decision, the Court held that the eleventh amendment
prohibited a federal court from ordering a state official to conform his conduct to state
law.24 The Court in Pennhurst II reasoned that the concerns of eleventh amendment
immunity for the state extend beyond questions of relief. The eleventh amendment, the
Court held, represents a requirement of state immunity rooted in the Constitution as
"an explicit limitation on the judicial power of the United States."25 The Court inter-
preted the eleventh amendment to provide broad, constitutional immunity from suit in
federal courts, and sharply restricted those doctrines which permitted suit. 26
The holding in Pennhurst II restricts the availability and reduces the effectiveness of
the federal courts in suits against state officials which present both federal and state law
issues. In such cases, plaintiffs must now either split their claims between federal and
state courts, or resort only to the state courts if they wish to have their claims heard
together. 27 This limit on the availability of a federal forum will significantly alter the
conduct of public law litigation. 28
are prohibited. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945). Injunctive
relief has been limited to injunctions which are prospective in operation. Retrospective relief has
been held to run afoul of the eleventh amendment. See F.delman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677
(1974).
20 See Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the Federal Courts Since Edelman v. Jordan: A Trip through
the Twilight Zone, 32 CASE W. L. REV. 364, 369 n.43 (1982).
21 See, e.g., Florida Dept of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (eleventh
amendment no bar to service of process in in rem proceeding against state officials for recovery of
artifacts) (5-4 decision on this issue); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (eleventh amendment
barred executor of Howard Hughes estate from filing statutory interpleader• in federal court to
resolve conflicting domicile claims of California and Texas) (6-3 decision); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410 (1979) (nothing in Constitution bars California from allowing a California citizen to sue the
state of Nevada in California state court) (6-3 decision); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(eleventh amendment bars federal court from issuing retroactive injunctive relief) (5-4 decision).
22 One commentator noted the confusing application of the eleventh amendment, and com-
pared the Court to the parable of the blind men and the elephant, each feeling the same creature
but describing it in very different terms. To this commentator, the "elephant" was federalism. Baker,
Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. Cow. L. REV. 139, 139, 172 (1977).
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 .U.S. 89 (1984) (Pennhurst II). The Court's
decision was its second consideration of this litigation, having previously remanded the case on
different grounds. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Pennhurst
I). For clarity, these cases are referred to as Pennhurst I and Pennhurst II.
" Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 125. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
which had affirmed an injunction against state officials on the basis of a pendent state law claim.
Id.
28 Id. at 119 (quoting Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933)).
26 1d. at 101-02.
2, Id. at 121-23.
28 See infra notes 350-72 and accompanying text.
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This note will analyze the eleventh amendment and the doctrine of state sovereign
immunity. Section one will consider the interpretation of the federal judicial power and
state sovereign immunity leading up to the ratification of the eleventh amendment. This
section will then survey the case law interpreting the eleventh amendment and state
sovereign immunity. Section two will review the history of the Pennhurst case and the
opinions of the lower courts and the Supreme Court in Pennhurst II. Section three will
analyze the Court's analysis of the eleventh amendment in Pennhurst II. This section will
discuss the Court's constitutionalization of state sovereign immunity through the eleventh
amendment, its restriction of permissible suits against state officials, and its rejection of
pendent jurisdiction applied to suits against state officials. By holding that the eleventh
amendment constitutionalized state sovereign immunity and by mechanically applying
the doctrines allowing suits against state officials, the Court blurs important issues un-
derlying the eleventh amendment. Most important, the Court failed to address the more
general underlying issue of federalism, as compounded by problems inherent in public
law litigation. As a result, the Court's holding in Pennhurst II does not clarify the confused
body of eleventh amendment jurisprudence, and instead adds yet another gloss to
eleventh amendment doctrines. These doctrines have drifted too far from the founda-
tional issue of federal judicial power, and these unwieldy doctrines are ill suited for the
flexible analysis required in addressing the subtle yet central issue of the limits of federal
judicial power over the states.
I. THE ADOPTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
The doctrines which today surround the eleventh amendment do not arise from
the text of the amendment itself. Instead, they are the result of a history of interpretation
which has departed from the the literal language of the amendment. These interpreta-
tions, however, have been based on an incomplete and inaccurate assessment of the
history of the ratification of the Constitution and of the eleventh amendment. Sovereign
immunity was reinterpreted in the creation of the American federal system. A survey of
the ratification of the Constitution reveals that the issue of state amenability to suit in
federal courts was unresolved. The adoption of the eleventh amendment achieved the
narrow purpose of removing state-citizen diversity jurisdiction, but beyond this narrow
goal its purpose is unclear.
The history of judicial interpretation of the eleventh amendmeiit, also neglected in
current doctrines, may be grouped into three major periods." During the Marshall
Court, which interpreted the structure and operation of the federal system, the eleventh
amendment remained a narrow, technical restriction on federal court jurisdiction. After
Reconstruction, the eleventh amendment was reinterpreted beyond its literal terms to
stand for a broader notion of state sovereign immunity. This period of reinterpretation
culminated, however, in the creation of a fiction to permit suit against state officials in
order to assure federal supremacy. Finally, the Burger Court's trend toward a more
limited role for the federal courts and increased regard for federalism has included
application of the eleventh amendment as a broad bar to suits against states in federal
29 Professor Shapiro wrote that "[t]he history of judicial interpretation of the [eleventh] amend-
ment illustrates in miniature much of the political and legal controversy since the early days of the
Republic." Shapiro, Wrong Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REV.
61, 61 (1984).
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courts. A survey of the history of the adoption and interpretation of the eleventh
amendment clarifies the origins of the eleventh amendment doctrines the Court applies
today.
A. State Sovereign Immunity in the United States and the Adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
Sovereign immunity is an ancient doctrine, with roots extending back to the English
monarchy. Originally, the doctrine was founded on the precept that "Nile King could
do no wrong."'" In practical terms, the doctrine meant that a sovereign could not be
sued in his own court. Instead, suit could only be brought in a higher court. Because
there was no earthly court higher than the King, however, he was immune from suits'
Although the theory of sovereign immunity was transported to the American colo-
nies, notions of sovereignty derived from a monarchy were difficult to apply to repre-
sentative governments." In framing a new system of government after the Revolutionary
War, Americans reinterpreted and redefined basic principles of government. The Amer-
ican federal system was a novel form of government, presenting unprecedented issues
of the relative powers of states and the federal government." Furthermore, this new
form of government required substantial adjustment in the concept of sovereignty itself,
including immunities. 34 Americans were concerned that basic rights be secure against
the government and that the individual have a forum and right of redress, which
reflected a change in the relationship between the government and its subjects."
The new American government included a novel role for the federal judiciary.
Under the Articles of Confederation, the nation lacked an effective national judiciary
which could bind the states in enforcing the provisions of the Peace Treaty of 1783."
The lack of an effective national judiciary was an important part of the impetus for the
Constitutional Convention," and the power of the federal judiciary was an important
part of the debate over the ratification of the Constitution. In particular, the power of
the federal courts to hear suits against states remained unsettled. Although many judicial
opinions" and commentators 39 have relied on an "original understanding" of state
5° See I F. PoLLocx & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 515 (2d ed. 1898).
'" Id. at 518.
52 See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1896-99; see generally B. BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 198-229 (1967).
" See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 ( J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
34 See generally B. BAILYN, supra note 32, at 202-29; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, No. 9, 15,
31, 32, 81 (A. Hamilton), No. 20 (A. Hamilton & J. Madison), No. 39, 40, 44, 45, 62 ( J. Madison).
" See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1898.
36 Id. at 1899; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, No. 22, at 151 (A. Hamilton).
37 See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1899.
"See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323-25 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 13-
14 (1890).
39 See 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 91-96 (1922). Relying
heavily on the assurances of Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton prior to ratification that the states
would be immune from suit without their consent.(see infra notes 40-45 and accompanying text),
Charles Warren argued that the Federalists struck a deal w achieve ratification. Id. at 91, 96.
The right of the Federal Judiciary to summon a State as defendant and to adjudicate
its rights and liabilities had been the subject of deep apprehension and of active debate
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution; but the existence of any such right
had been disclaimed by many of the most eminent advocates of the new Federal
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sovereign immunity at the adoption of the Constitution, little evidence supports a con-
tention of any dominantly held view.
Most proponents of an original understanding rely on statements made by Madison
and Marshall in the ratification debates in Virginia, 4° and upon Hamilton's statements
in The Federalist No. 81. 41
 In the Virginia ratification debates, antifederalists Patrick
Henry and George Mason asserted that the proposed constitution would empower a
federal court to force the state to pay its debts, and to force citizens who had paid debts
to the state under the state escheat laws to pay again. 42
 Madison and Marshall argued
that article III conferred no such power, and that at most it enabled a federal court to
hear suits with the state as plaintiff. 13 In The Federalist No. 81, Hamilton also denied that
article III would enable the federal courts to hear a suit against a state, without its
consent, brought by a citizen of a different state on public securities issued by the state.'"
Proponents of an "original understanding" point to these statements as evidence of an
understanding at the adoption of the Constitution that the states would be immune from
suit in federal court. 45
At the adoption of the Constitution, however, there was no unanimous agreement
that the states would be immune from suit in federal courts. 46
 Substantial authority
supports the argument that article III was, in fact, intended to abrogate state sovereign
immunity. Two of the five members of the Committee of Detail which drafted the article
Government, and it was largely owing to their successful dissipation of the fear of the
existence of such Federal power that the Constitution was finally adopted.
Id. at 91. According to Warren, the Court's decision in Chisholm, subjecting Georgia to suit without
its consent, violated this general understanding, and created a "shock of surprise." The eleventh
amendment was immediately adopted to overturn the result of Chisholm, and hold the Federalists
to their bargain. Id. at 96 (discussing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 401 (1791)). See infra
notes 50-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. Furthermore, Warren argued, the
understanding the eleventh amendment restored was that the states retained a broad immunity
from suit in the federal courts. Therefore, the eleventh amendment must be read to represent this
broad understanding. C. WARREN, supra, at 96.
90 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 533, 555-56 ( J. Elliot ed. 1836) [hereinafter cited as ELLIOT'S DEBATES]; see Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 n.9 (1974).
4 ' THE FEDERALIST, supra note 33, No. 81, at 487-88 (A. Hamilton).
42 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 526-27, 543.
" Id, at 533, 555-56.
44 THE FEDERALIST, Mira note 33, No. 81, at 487-88 (A. Hamilton):
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual
without its consent . . . . Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the
plan of the convention, it will remain with the states, and the danger intimated must
be merely ideal .... The contracts between a nation and individuals are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.
They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign will.
Id. (emphasis in original).
45
 See supra notes 38-39.
46
 Recent commentators have challenged this traditional view, each starting by questioning the
original understanding of state sovereign immunity at the ratification of the Constitution. At most,
these commentators conclude, the evidence supports only a conclusion that a broad range of
understanding existed. See C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 40
(1972); Field, supra note 7, at 534; Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1913; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation,
supra note 3, at 1054. Several contend that if any understanding was predominant, it was that article
III did abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states. See C. JAcoes, supra, at 40; Field, supra note
7, at 534-35.
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III grant of power insisted that the Constitution abrogated state sovereign immunity. 47
State amenability to suit was debated in the state legislatures, and was not resolved even
as the Constitution was ratified." The issue remained unsettled after ratification, and
plaintiffs filed suits against states in the Supreme Court's first term, assuming the states
were not immune from suit. 49
The Supreme Court first addressed whether article III empowered the federal
courts to hear suits against states in Chisholm v. Georgia." In Chisholm, the Court exercised
its original jurisdiction to hear an action in assumpsit by the executor of the estate of a
South Carolina merchant against the State of Georgia.51 The South Carolina merchant
had sold military goods to Georgia, and the executor sued the state to collect money
owed.52 Georgia refused to appear to defend, asserting that it was, as a sovereign,
47 Edmund Randolph, a member of the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention,
declared in the Virginia ratification debates, "1 admire that part which forces Virginia to pay her
debts." 3 ELuor's DEBATES, supra note 40, at 207. Randolph defended the state-citizen grant of
jurisdiction from attack and from Madison's and Marshall's construction limiting jurisdiction to
suits in which the state is plaintiff: "If a[n independent] government refuses to do justice to
individuals [of another independent statej, war is the consequence. Is this the bloody alternative to
which we are referred?" Id. at 573. Randolph would later represent the plaintiffs in Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). James Wilson, also a member of the Committee of Detail,
defended the clause in the Pennsylvania ratification debates. 2 am -Cs DEBATES, supra note 40, at
491. Wilson was a member of the Supreme Court which heard Chisholm, and he supported the
Court's holding that article Ill abrogated the sovereign immunity of the states. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at
466. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text.
" During the ratification debates, several states proposed amendments to the Constitution to
limit or eliminate the states' amenability to suit in federal courts. See 3 Euto-r's DEBATES, supra note
40, at 660-61 (Virginia: amendment to eliminate all diversity and federal question jurisdiction); 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 40, at 246 (North Carolina: same); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note
40, at 409 (New York: amendment to bar any suit against a state). In Congress, an amendment to
the Constitution was proposed during debate of the Judiciary Act of 1789 to strike the article III
grant of state-citizen diversity. I ANNALS OF CONG. 762 ( J. Gales ed. 1789). That these proposed
amendments were felt necessary casts doubt that a "general understanding" existed that the states
were immune from suit.
49 See Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320 (1796), dismissed sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dail.) 378 (1798) (eleventh amendment applies to bar pending actions); Georgia
v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792) (action by British citizen and South Carolina loyalists
against state, challenging validity of sequestration laws); Oswald v. New York, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401
(1792) (action by Pennsylvania citizen seeking payment for services rendered); Vanstophorst v.
Maryland, 2 U.S, (2 Dall.) 401 (1791) (action against states by Dutch bankers). See generally Gibbons,
supra note 3, at 1920-21.
'° 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
s' The facts of the case have engendered some dispute. Warren stated that the suit was on
behalf of a British creditor. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 39, at 93 n.1. His error has been corrected.
See C. JAcoBs, supra note 46, at 47 (1972); Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation,
2 GA. L. REV. 207,217 n.38 (1968).
72 C. JAcoBs, supra note 46, at 47. The Georgia legislature had refused to satisfy the merchant's
claim, suggesting he sue the commissioners who had purchased the goods. Chisholm, the merchant's
executor, did not sue the insolvent commissioners, and chose to sue the state in federal court. The
district court dismissed his suit, holding the court had no jurisdiction. id. at 47 n.29 (citing Farquhar's
Executor v. Georgia (1791) (unreported case)). Chisholm then filed an original bill in the Supreme
Court. Id. at 47. In the Supreme Court, the plaintiff was represented by Edmund Randolph, who
was then Attorney General of the United States. 2 U.S. (2 Dail.) at 419. Randolph had been a
member of the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention which had drafted the article
Ill grant of power, and was a defender of that clause granting jurisdiction in federal courts over
suits against a state. See supra note 47.
954	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:947
immune from suit without its consent." The issue of whether a state was suable by
individual citizens of another state was thus squarely presented. The Court in Chisholm
held that article III granted the federal judiciary power to hear suits against a state by
a citizen of another state in the clause granting diversity jurisdiction." Accordingly, the
Court held that Georgia must defend the suit, or else a default judgment would be
entered against the state. 55
The Court's decision in Chisholm prompted an immediate and hostile reaction. The
Georgia House of Representatives resolved that any attempt to enforce the Supreme
Court's judgment was a felony, punishable by hanging without benefit of clergy." A
resolution introduced into the United,States Senate within days of the Supreme Court's
decision called for a constitutional amendment to overturn the result in Chisholm." In
1794, the eleventh amendment passed both houses, was subsequently ratified by the
states, and became effective in 1798. 58
The purpose of the eleventh amendment was to overturn the result in Chisholm.
The question remained, however, how far beyond that narrow purpose the eleventh
amendment was to extend. The language of the amendment implies that it is not an
absolute bar to suit against states." The breadth of the bar, however, was only gradually
to be resolved. While overturning the result in Chisholm, the adoption of the eleventh
2 U.S. (2 Dail) at 419.
" Id. at 478 (opinion of Jay, Q.). The opinions were delivered seriatim, with five justices holding
the state suable, and one dissenter. Among the majority were Chief Justice Jay and Justice James
Wilson, who had been a member of the Committee of Detail at the Constitutional Convention which
had drafted the article III grant of power. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. The lone
dissenter in Chisholm was Justice Iredell, who argued that jurisdiction had not been statutorily
implemented. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 449 (opinion of Iredell, J.). Justice Iredell went on, in what he
labelled dicta, to state that "my present opinion is strongly against any Construction of it, which will
admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a state for the recovery of money." Id.
Some later Courts treated Justice Iredell's opinion as the general understanding that states were
immune from suit, and the eleventh amendment as vindicating his opinion. See, e.g., Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S, 1,18-19 (1890).
" 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 479.
66 See C. JACOBS, supra note 46, at 56-57.
" See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1927. There is some dispute over how soon after the decision
in Chisholm was read in the Supreme Court this resolution was introduced. Warren, widely cited,
states that the resolution was introduced the next day in the House. 1 C. WARREN, supra note 39,
at 101. Gibbons contends, from a search of the Annals of Congress and the National Archives, that
a resolution was first introduced in the Senate two days later. Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1926. In
addition, commentators differ on the force of the reaction to Chisholm. Compare 1 C. WARREN, supra
note 39, at 96-101, with Nowak, supra note 8, at 1433-36, and Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1926-27.
58 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
Id.
" The language of the eleventh amendment, see .supra note 58, closely parallels the grant of
jurisdiction in article Ill, see supra note 2. Some commentators have asserted that the last fourteen
words of the eleventh amendment restrict its operation, and preclude interpreting it as a broad,
categorical immunity. This shows, they contend, that the eleventh amendment was intended as a
narrow, technical restriction on the jurisdiction based solely on party status, and does not reach the
independent grants of jurisdiction, such as federal question jurisdiction. See, e.g., Gibbons, supra
note 3, at 1927; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1060.
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amendment did not necessarily constitutionalize a "general understanding" that the states
would be immune from suit."
In.a recent article, Judge Gibbons examined the historical circumstances surround-
ing the adoption of the eleventh amendment and its "revision" after 1875. 61 Starting
with the premise that there was at most a variety of opinions at ratification of the
Constitution whether article III abrogated state sovereign immunity, Judge Gibbons
interpreted the eleventh amendment as a narrow, technical restriction on the jurisdiction
of the federal courts." The Federalists then in power narrowly framed the amendment
. to overturn the particular result in Chisholm, and thus defuse calls for a new constitutional
convention and stem the tide of Republican furor. 63 The Federalists succeeded in over-
turning Chisholm in the narrowest fashion, thus maintaining the enforceability of the
Peace Treaty with Great Britain against the states." According to Judge Gibbons, there-
fore, the eleventh amendment is a narrow, technical bar to jurisdiction when state-citizen
diversity is the only basis for jurisdiction in a suit against a state." Thus, the eleventh
amendment does not require a broad state sovereign immunity, according to Judge
Gibbons; however, an independent doctrine of state sovereign immunity remains. 66 The
error presently committed, Judge Gibbons contended, is in reading that separate doctrine
into the eleventh amendment.°
Professor Fletcher has argued for a similarly limited reading of the eleventh amend-
ment." Professor Fletcher concluded that the eleventh amendment restricts the article
III grant of jurisdiction between states and citizens of other states to cases in which the
state is the plaintiff. 69 Thus, according to Professor Fletcher, the eleventh amendment
does not speak directly to suits which come into federal courts under another head of
jurisdiction, such as federal questions.7°
Despite assertions that the eleventh amendment had the broader purpose of restor-
ing an original understanding of state immunity, 7 ' the history of the adoption of the
6° Professor Field argues that the eleventh amendment only overturned the decision in Chisholm;
neither the amendment nor article III contain any constitutional requirement of state sovereign
immunity. Field, supra note 7, at 538. Instead, she contends, the eleventh amendment states simply
that the adoption of article III did not abrogate the ancient, common law doctrine of sovereign
immunity as applied to the states. Id. at 540. According to Professor Field, what exists after adoption
of the eleventh amendment is the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, which may be .
continued, modified, or repealed by Congress or the courts. Id.
61 Gibbons, supra note 3. judge Gibbons wrote the opinion for the court of appeals in Pennhurst
II. See infra notes 154-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of his opinion.
62 Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1894.
65 Id. at 1934.
64 Id. at 1934-35. In the treaty with Great Britain, the parties "agreed that creditors on either
side, shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money, of
all bona fide debts heretofore contracted." Definitive Treaty of Peace with Great Britain (Treaty of
Paris), Sept. 3, 1783, United States-Great Britain, art. IV, 8 Stai. 80, 82 (1783). The American
states, especially in the South, objected to these provisions of articles IV, V, and VI of the treaty,
which the national government had pledged to enforce. See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1899-1902.
65 1d. at 1937.
66 Id. at 2004.
87 Id. at 1936-37, 2004.
66 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1036-37.
69 Id. at 1035. This interpretation is in keeping with the arguments advanced by Madison and
Marshall during the ratification debates in Virginia. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
7° Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1036.
n "The Amendment's language overruled the particular result in Chisholm, but this Court has
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Constitution reveals no such general understanding. The eleventh amendment was more
narrowly tailored to overturn the particular result in Chisholm. The expansive interpre-
tation of the eleventh amendment to stand for broad state immunity arose from later
judicial interpretation.
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
The expansive interpretation given to the eleventh amendment today arose not
from an understanding at the adoption of the Constitution or the eleventh amendment,
but from judicial reinterpretation in the particular historical circumstances of the post-
Reconstruction era. Examining the historical development of eleventh amendment in-
terpretation clarifies the genesis of the doctrines applied today, and illuminates the
fundamental issue of federalism which lies behind the Court's eleventh amendment
analysis.
The adoption of the eleventh amendment did not resolve the limits of federal judicial
power over the states. Initially, the amendment was applied within its narrow terms to
bar suits based only on state-citizen diversity. Other aspects of federal judicial power
were challenged in the early nineteenth century as the states and the federal government
defined and shaped the workings of the novel federal system. 72 The Supreme Court's
decisions in this early period, especially those of the Marshall Court, are distinguished
by this concern for the federal structure.
Because general federal question jurisdiction was not granted until 1875, 73 the
eleventh amendment's reach was only tested in a limited area of article III jurisdiction.
Prior to 1875, the eleventh amendment was dispositive in only one case. 7" That case,
moreover, fell within the literal terms of the eleventh amendment: federal jurisdiction
was based solely on state-citizen diversity. 75 Thus, the Marshall and Taney Courts did
not apply the eleventh amendment beyond its terms of a narrow, technical restriction
on federal court jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Marshall did have occasion to consider the
reach of federal judicial power in other, more general instances, however. In Cohens v.
Virginia, 76 the Court upheld its jurisdiction over a writ of error to a state court decision
arising under the Constitution, in which Virginia had convicted the defendant for selling
recognized that its greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of
sovereign immunity limits the grant of judicial authority in Art. III." Pennhursl 11, 465 U.S. at 98.
Cf. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3171 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
original Constitution did not embody a principle of sovereign immunity as a limit on the federal
judicial power. There is simply no reason to believe that the Eleventh Amendment established such
a broad principle for the first time.").
" See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (Supreme Court review of state
court criminal proceedings); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (Supreme
Court review of federal issues in state court decisions); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87
(1810) (Supreme Court review of actions of state legislatures); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch.) 137 (1803) (Supreme Court review of congressional legislation).
" Federal question jurisdiction was granted for a brief period in 1801-1802, but was not
extended for any significant period until 1875. See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1941 n.279.
" Ex parte Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627 (1833). See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1961-68.
75 Ex pane Madrazzo, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 627, 632 (1833).
76 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
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lottery tickets." Chief justice Marshall rejected Virginia's claim that the eleventh amend-
ment barred this suit because the state was a party to the suit and thus forced to appear. 78
The judicial power, the Court held, extended to cases "arising under the [Cionstitution
or laws of the United States,"75 and to which Congress had passed enabling legislation. 8°
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States," the Marshall Court held that the eleventh
amendment did not bar district court jurisdiction in issuing an injunction against state
officials in a case arising under federal law. 82 Chief justice Marshall, while holding that
the case arose under federal law, also suggested that the eleventh amendment was limited
to suits in which the state was named as a defendant." Although Chief Justice Marshall
later expanded this interpretation, 84 the limited effect given the eleventh amendment,
applying it only within its literal terms, remained the interpretation of the eleventh
amendment for over fifty years.
The Civil War and its aftermath worked a fundamental restructuring of the rela-
tionship between the federal government and the states. The adoption of the thirteenth,
fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments extended the reach of the federal government
and limited state power and autonomy. During this period, federal question jurisdiction
was extended to the federal courts, 85 and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 created a cause
of action for deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law."
The question of the eleventh amendment's scope was reconsidered during this
period of adjustment between the federal government and the states. This reevaluation
was precipitated by defaults on bonds issued by southern state governments. 87 Creditors
"Id. at 412. See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (writ of error to state
court not barred by eleventh amendment even where state-citizen diversity existed between the
parties). See also Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1952-56.
78 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 412.
7° Id.
8° Id. at 429-30.
si 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
" Id. at 856. In Osborn, the state of Ohio sought to impose a tax on the Bank of the United
States, and state officers seized notes and currency from the Bank, ignoring a federal district court
injunction. Id, at 739-44. The suit in Osborn arose under the federal act establishing the bank, not
under general federal question jurisdiction. Id at 823.
" Id. at 857.
84 In a later case, Chief justice Marshall expanded this interpretation to include a suit brought
against a Governor in his official capacity. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110,
123-24 (1828). See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1961-67 for an extensive discussion of this case,
arguing that Chief justice Marshall avoided holding that the eleventh amendment applied to suits
in admiralty.
ss Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
86 Ku Klux Klan Act, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)).
87 Defaulted bonds became a serious problem in this period. Defaults by southern states,
burdened with debts from the war and from Reconstruction governments, became common. The
issue of "adjusting" the bonds became a political cause of resurgent Democrats in the South. See
Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study in Judicial Power, 1983 U.
ILL. L. REV. 423, 431-35 [hereinafter cited as Orth, Interpretation]; Orth, The Eleventh Amendment
and the North Carolina State Debt, 59 N.C.L. REV. 747, 753-64 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Orth,
North Carolina]; see also Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1974-82. Defaults were not limited to the South.
Defaults elsewhere, however, differed in at least one critical respect. Bonds in the Midwest, another
source of frequent bond defaults, were generally issued by cities and local governments. In the
South, which was less urbanized, bonds were generally issued and approved by the state legislature.
See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1976. The Supreme Court enforced the obligations of local bonds,
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sued the states in the federal courts, seeking relief they were unable to obtain from the
states.88 At first, the federal courts extended protection to the bondholders. 89
After the Compromise of 1877,9° however, the Court began to dispose of default
bond cases under the eleventh amendment. 91 In Hans v. Louisiana,92 the culmination of
this line of cases, holders of Louisiana bonds sought to avoid the strictures of the eleventh
amendment by having a citizen of Louisiana bring suit in federal court under federal
question jurisdiction." The bondholders reasoned that the eleventh amendment's terms
applied only to suits by citizens of different states. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
held that the federal court did not have jurisdiction to hear this claim against the state- 94
Although the literal terms of the eleventh amendment did not reach this case, the citizen
being of the same state, the Court reasoned' that the states would not have adopted a
holding that the eleventh amendment protected only the state, not political subdivisions and local
governmental units. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890). The distinction
between a state and its subdivisions for purposes of the eleventh amendment persists. See Pennhurst
II, 465 U.S. at 123 n.34. See generally 6 C. FAIRMAN, HisToky OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88 ch. XIII–X1V (1971), for a discussion of
the nineteenth century municipal bond cases.
" The Virginia "coupon-killer" laws are an example of state obstruction of efforts of bond-
holders to protect their rights. The state had previously made bond coupons legal tender for
payment of taxes. Legislation passed in 1882 required taxpayers to pay taxes in cash before seeking
to compel the tax collector to accept the coupons and refund the cash in a judicial proceeding, in
which the taxpayer had the burden of persuading the jury that the coupons were valid. See Gibbons,
supra note 3, at 1986-87.
49 Louisiana passed legislation in 1875 which had the effect of reducing the value of collateral
pledged by the state on issuing bonds. Id. at 1977. In an early suit by a Delaware citizen, the
Supreme Court affirmed a circuit court injunction restraining Louisiana state officials from at-
tempting to carry out the act. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531, 541 (1875).
9° By 1877, the Republican Reconstruction governments in the southern states were being
replaced by Democrats. The results of the election in 1876 were disputed, provoking a constitutional
crisis over whose electors would be seated, and the Democrat-controlled House threatened to let
Grant's term expire without resolving the election. In what is generally called the Compromise of
1877, the Republican Hayes secured the Presidency. Soon thereafter, the Republican President
ceased using federal troops to protect southern Reconstruction governments, and Congress passed
the Posse Comitatus Act, forbidding the use of military personnel in a posse comitatus. The federal
government lost its only effective means of enforcing laws in the South, hastening the end of
Reconstruction. See Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1978-81.
91 In a new state constitution, Louisiana diverted taxes pledged to payments on the bond to the
state treasury to meet general expenses. While relying on the precedent of Board of Liquidation v.
McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875), see supra note 89, bondholders pursued other avenues to assure a
federal forum. The bondholders assigned bonds to the states of New Hampshire and New York,
which sued Louisiana — suits between states did not fall within the terms of the eleventh amend-
ment. The Supreme Court held that a state could not sue another state on behalf of its citizens.
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883). In the suit by bondholders from other states,
the Supreme Court held that the suit was barred by the eleventh amendment, despite the precedent
of McComb. Louisiana v. jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 725-27 (1882). See generally Gibbons, supra note 3, at
1968-91; Orth, Interpretation, supra note 87, at 435-38.
92
 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
9' Id. at 9.
94 Id. at 15. The Supreme Court has generally interpreted Hans as rooting this immunity in the
eleventh amendment. See, e.g., Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683
n.17 (1982). However, the Court's language in Hans may be interpreted as implying the immunity
from another source. 134 U.S. at 15. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 314 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing Court in Haas applied a non-constitutional
doctrine of sovereign immunity).
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provision which barred suits by citizens of different states, while allowing suits by its own
citizens."
Examining the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the eleventh amendment,
the Court concluded that the decision of Chisholm departed from an original understand-
ing that the states would be immune from suit. 96 The Chisholm decision, the Court
continued, created a "shock of surprise throughout the country."97 Allowing citizens to
sue their own state in federal court, the Court concluded, would be an anomalous result
"no less startling and unexpected."" The Court therefore reasoned that the principles
of the eleventh amendment barred this suit as well."
The revision of eleventh amendment interpretation in Hans was a product of the
post-Civil War restructuring of the federal system. Bond defaults by southern states
posed a severe political problem to federal enforcement of a Court decision against the
states.'" The expansive interpretation of the eleventh amendment in Hans avoided
confronting this practical limitation on the Court's power.' 01
At the same time that the Court interpreted the eleventh amendment to provide
this broad immunity from suit in federal courts, however, a new kind of suit began to
be pressed against the states. As states began to regulate railroads and their rates, the
railroads sought protection in the federal courts.'" Only eighteen years after Hans, the
Supreme Court created an important exception to the broad sovereign immunity pro-
tection that the Hans Court had read into the eleventh amendment.
In Ex parte Young,'" the Court upheld a district court decree enjoining the Attorney
General of Minnesota from bringing suit in state courts against railroads for violation
of maximum rates set by the state.'" The railroads argued that the state-imposed rates
were confiscatory, and thus violated their rights under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.'" Furthermore, the state legislation imposed heavy fines and
criminal sanctions for failure to comply with these rates. L°6
95 Ham, 134 U.S. at 15.
96 id.
97 Id. at I1.
" Id. at 10— II.
99 Id, at 21. Justice Harlan concurred in the judgment of the Court, but in a brief opinion he
disagreed with the Court's statements about Chisholm, which Harlan found "based upon a sound
interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then was." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
'°° See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
101 Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1989-2003. Judge Gibbons concluded that the Court granted the
defaulting southern states this broader immunity in order to avoid reaching a decision which the
Court could not enforce, while maintaining jurisdiction over defaulting local governments. Id. at
1971, 1976-78, 2000. See also Orth, Interpretation, supra note 87, at 424. See supra note 87 for a
discussion of the differences between bond defaults by southern states and by local governments.
102 See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 432-34 (1978); Gibbons, supra note 3, at
2000. This era marked the rise of substantive due process as the Court struck down legislation
infringing liberty of contract. This period is most closely associated with the Court's decision
invalidating state regulation of maximum hours for bakers in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
1115 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Court's decision in Ex parte Young must be considered in light of
the development of substantive due process. In fact, both Lochner and Ex pane Young were written
by Justice Peckham. See generally Duker, Mr. Justice Rufus W. Peckham and the Case of Ex Pane Young:
Lochnerizing Munn v. Illinois, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REv. 539.
104 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 126.
105 Id. at 130-31.
101 Id. at 145.
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The Court in Ex pane Young adopted the fiction that actions of a state official which
contravene the federal constitution are not actions of the state.'° 7 Rather, these were
deemed to be individual actions by the state official, not within the protection of the
eleventh amendment. 108 The unconstitutional actions stripped the official of any official
character, permitting suit to continue against the official as an individual. This separation
of the individual acts of the official from those of the state was not new. Prior cases had
already held that sovereign immunity did not protect officials for common law torts. 109
The Court in Ex parte Young extended this doctrine of individual action of the official,
rather than holding that state sovereign immunity did not extend to violations of the
federal Constitution.w)
By employing this fiction of individual action by the official, the railroads could
challenge the constitutionality of the state laws. The Court found the other methods by
which the railroads could have tested the constitutionality of the state laws insufficient
protection for constitutional rights."' If the railroad chose to ignore the laws and defend
in state court on constitutional grounds, the Court noted, they would be forced to face
imprisonment and fines, a "risk the company ought not to be required to take.""!
Therefore, the Court concluded, this case was an appropriate exercise of federal juris-
diction, allowing the railroads to use their constitutional protection as a sword, not merely
as a shield," 3 against violations.
Justice Harlan alone dissented, noting that the Court now permitted suits against
state officials where they had previously been barred."' Justice Harlan argued that there
was no basis for suing the defendant other than in his official capacity, and that the
Id. at 159-60.
'°0 Id. The Court stated:
It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting by the use of
the name of the State to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because uncon-
stitutional ... and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character
and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.
Id.
109 See supra note 13 and cases cited therein. The Supreme Court in In re Ayers held that the
individual official must threaten plaintiff's personal or property rights, and be personally and
individually liable for the conduct. 123 U.S. 443, 500-01 (1887). In other words, the plaintiff must
state a cause of action against the individual; the unconstitutionality of his action leaves the official
defenseless.
"° In Ex parte Young, the state official sued did not commit a common law wrong to the plaintiffs,
as was required in In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 500-01 (1887). Thus, Ex parte Young extended this
separation of the official from the state into a fiction employed to circumvent the broad interpre-
tation of state immunity extended in Hans, 134 U.S. at 160. Today, this extension in Ex parte Young
is viewed almost exclusively as a fiction. See Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 105; 17 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
& E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4231, at 359 (1978 & Supp. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER]; C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 48, at 209 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT].
'" Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 165.
"2 Id.
13 See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664 (1974).
14 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 169 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan noted that he, too,
had reversed positions. In Hans, justice Harlan had concurred, but disagreed with the Hans Court's
assertion that Chisholm had violated an original understanding of state sovereign immunity. See supra
note 99.
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majority's holding would prevent the state from proceeding in its own courts. 135 This
intrusion was severe, he contended, reaching the essential state function of proceeding
in its own courts, and left no basis for the fiction that the suit was anything but a suit
against the state. Therefore, he concluded, this suit should be barred by the eleventh
amendment. "6
, Hans and Ex parte Young created a tension in eleventh amendment jurisprudence.
The courts interpreted the eleventh amendment as a broad constitutional grant of state
sovereign immunity," 7 which extended beyond its literal terms. At the same time, the
Court had created the Young doctrine, a fiction which enabled the courts to strip state
officials, and thus indirectly the state, of that immunity. Subsequent cases reflect this
tension, as courts attempted to reconcile the conflicting interests." 5
Beginning with school desegregation in the 1950's, federal courts increasingly issued
affirmative injunctions against state officials to remedy constitutional violations. 1 F 9 The
fiction of Ex pane Young enabled the federal courts to issue injunctions against these state
officials, and was thus the vehicle for tremendous growth in the involvement of federal
courts in suits against state officials.'" In 1964, the Supreme Court further limited the
protections of eleventh amendment immunity to the states by holding that state involve-
ment in an area regulated by Congress was a waiver of sovereign immunity.
"5 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan argued that this suit
was:
[A]s to the defendant Young, one against him as, and only because he was, Attorney
General of Minnesota. No relief was sought against him individually but only his
capacity as Attorney General. And the manifest, indeed the avowed and admitted,
object of seeking such relief was to tie the hands of the State so that it could not in any
manner or by any mode of proceeding, in its own courts, test the validity of the statutes
and orders in question.
Id. (emphasis in original).
16 Id. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"' Prior to Hams, these notions were not always kept distinct. In United States v. Lee, Robert E.
Lee's son sued to recover property — the family's Arlington estate — seized by the United States
government for nonpayment of taxes during the Civil War. The Supreme Court held that the
federal government's sovereign immunity was not a bar to action against the federal officials in this
case. 106 U.S. 196, 223 (1882). In dissent, Justice Gray argued that federal and state sovereign
immunity were indistinguishable, and that state sovereign immunity was constitutionalized by the
eleventh amendment. 106 U.S. at 226-34 (Gray, J., dissenting). See also Gibbons, supra note 3, at
1973.
The eleventh amendment continued to be interpreted as a broad constitutional bar to suits
against states in Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In that case, state bonds which had
been repudiated were assigned to the Principality of Monaco, which sued the state in federal court.
Id. at 317-18. The bonds had been issued in 1833 and 1838, one hundred years before coming
into the hands of the Principality of Monaco. Id. Although the eleventh amendment's terms do not
extend to suits by a foreign state, the Court relied on Hans to bar this suit. Id. at 322 ("behind the
words of the constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control"). Despite the broad
protection thus extended, however, federal courts continued to apply the doctrine of Ex parte Young
to suits against state officials.
See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228 (1964)
(school desegregation).
' 2° See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 690 (1978) (prisons); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964) (voting reapportionment); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (mental
hospitals), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
121 Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S, 184, 196 (1964).
121 This
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doctrine of constructive waiver extended the range of permissible suits against states in
federal courts. 122
Beginning in 1971, however, the Court began to reexamine the limits on federal
judicial power over the states, including the limits imposed by the eleventh amend-
ment.' 23 The Court defined the states' eleventh amendment protection in Edelman v.
Jordan, its most complete statement of the eleventh amendment's bar. 124 In Edelman,
plaintiffs in a class action sued Illinois officials administering federally assisted programs
for the aged, blind, and disabled for failing to comply with federal time limits on
processing applications. 123 Plaintiffs sought an injunction to force compliance, and also
to remit wrongfully withheld benefits.' 26 The district court issued an injunction, and the
court of appeals affirmed, characterizing the relief as "equitable" and thus permissible
under the eleventh amendment.' 27 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the elev-
enth amendment barred a federal court from issuing an injunction which granted
retroactive relief.'" Retroactive relief, the Court reasoned, too closely resembled a mon-
etary award directly against the state.'" This limitation built upon prior Court decisions
which reasoned that money damages which clearly would come from the state treasury
and not the individual official were too difficult to grant while maintaining the fiction
of Ex parte Young. 13° The Court stressed that prohibition of retroactive relief was also
necessary in order to maintain the fiction of Ex parte Young that the suit is against the
individual official and not the state."'
122 Id.
' 23 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress may not regulate
pursuant to the commerce power where it would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.") (overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985)); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) (federalism
prohibits federal court injunction ordering improved police grievance procedures); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490 (1975) (broad range of plaintiff's lacked standing to challenge exclusionary zoning
laws); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) ("Our Federalism" prohibits federal court injunction
to stay state court criminal proceeding). See also Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1191 (1977).
' 24 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
123 Id. at 653.
' 26 Id. at 653-56.
127 Id. at 665-66. The court of appeals in Edelman distinguished equitable relief from an action
for damages. Id. The Supreme Court had previously held that an action for money damages which
clearly would come from the state treasury and not from the individual official was barred by the
eleventh amendment. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945);
Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 50 (1944). "[Wlhen the action is in essence one
for the recovery of money from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is
entitled to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials arc nominal
defendants." Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
128 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665.
' 29 Id.
'm See supra note 127.
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. "As in most areas of the law, the difference between the type of
relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in
many instances be that between day and night." Id. Edelman's distinction between prospective and
retrospective injunctive relief has been followed even where the prospective relief involves expen-
ditures directly from the state. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley (II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (eleventh
amendment no bar to injunctions against Michigan Governor to pay share of costs of remedial
desegregation of schools). The limit on relief' has been modified, however, where Congress, acting
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In summary, the law prior to Pennhurst II reflected a tension between the doctrine
of Hans, extending an immunity to the states broader than the terms of the eleventh
amendment, and the doctrine of Ex parte Young, employing the fiction that a suit against
the official was not a suit against the state. Edelman limited the reach of the Young
doctrine, allowing only prospective injunctive relief, but did not remove the tension
inherent in granting broad immunity to the states while allowing injunctions against state
officials. This tension is the result of the Court's expansive interpretation of the eleventh
amendment. The Court's doctrines reflect its concern for issues of federalism, both state
autonomy and federal supremacy. By addressing these concerns through the eleventh
amendment, however, the resulting doctrines are confused and the focus on federalism
is distorted.
II. PENNHURST STATE SCHOOL & HOSPITAL V. H ALDERMAN
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst II was the result of a complex institutional
suit which was before the Supreme Court for the second time in litigation spanning a
decade."2 This section examines the Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst 11. Part A
describes the origins of the Pennhurst litigation, and traces the litigation through the
court of appeals and to the Supreme Court for the first time in Pennhurst 1. 133 Part B
examines the decision of the court of appeals on remand in Pennhurst //. 134 Finally, Part
C will consider the opinions of the Supreme Court in Pennhurst II.'"
A. The origins of Pennhurst and Pennhurst 1
Pennhurst State School and Hospital was a large institution run by the State of
Pennsylvania for the care and treatment of the mentally retarded. The institution was
overcrowded and grossly understaffed," and the conditions were shocking. Patients
were routinely drugged for ease of control, not for treatment,' 37 and physically restrained
as a control measure in lieu of adequate staffing,'" The hospital's environment was
physically and psychologically hazardous.' 39 Patients were unprotected from abuse by
other patients or self-abuse,"° and were physically abused by staff members."' Excre-
ment and urine often smeared ward floors, and living areas did not meet minimal
standards of cleanliness. 12 Patients at Pennhurst received little or no habilitation. Fre-
quently, patients suffered physical deterioration and behavioral and intellectual regres-
pursuant to section five of the fourteenth amendment, permits damages against states. See Fitzpa-
trick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). In other cases, decided by slim majorities, the eleventh
amendment's application has been difficult to reconcile. See supra note 21 and cases cited therein.
152 Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
modified, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), rev'd 451 U.S. 1 (1981), aff'd on remand, 673 F.2d
647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
199
	
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Pennhurst I).
'" 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane), rev'd 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
m" 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
446 F. Supp. at 1303.
'"	 at 1307.
0, Id. at 1306.
"5 Id. at 1308.
Id.
' 41 Id. at 1309. The district court noted that one patient had been raped by a staff member. Id.
' 4 ' Id. at 1308.
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sion. 143 All parties agreed that Pennhurst was inappropriate and inadequate for the
habilitation of the retarded.'"
Terri Lee Halderman, a minor and a retarded resident of Pennhurst, acted as the
class representative for all residents in a class action against Pennhurst, its superinten-
dent, and state officials responsible for its operation.'" The plaintiffs charged that
Pennhurst's conditions and operation violated the class members' rights under the federal
Constitution,'" federal statutes,'" and a state statute.'" The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that conditions at Pennhurst violated
plaintiffs' rights on constitutional, federal statutory, and state statutory grounds)" Con-
cluding that Pennhurst, as an institution, could not adequately protect the patients'
federal and state rights, the district court ordered other provisions for the care of those
at Pennhurst and appointed a Special Master to carry out the court's orders) 5° The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit substantially affirmed the district
court's decisions, relying primarily on the federal statutory provisions of the Bill of
Rights section of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 15 '
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, finding that the Devel-
opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act did not confer any substantive
rights to the mentally retarded, and thus granted no private cause of action.'" Noting
that the court of appeals had avoided the other grounds for the district court's decision
— the Constitution, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and state law — the
Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of these issues.'"
io Id. at 1309.
"4 Id. at 1304.
"5 The plaintiff class was expanded to include all persons who were or might become residents
of Pennhurst. Id. at 1300-01. In addition, the Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Citizens
(PARC) and the United States were allowed to intervene, and defendants ultimately included
Pennhurst, several of its officials, the State Department of Public Welfare and several of' its Com-
missioners, county mental retardation administrators, and various other officials of surrounding
counties. Id. at 1301-02.
16 Plaintiffs asserted violations of various constitutional rights, primarily under the eighth and
fourteenth amendments. Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 93.
147 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976 ed. & Supp. V); Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §6001 et seq. (1976 ed. and Supp. V).
148 Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50,
§ 4101 et seq. (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as "MlliMR Act"].
' 49 446 F. Supp. at 1320, 1322, 1323, 1324. These rights, variously formulated, included rights
to "minimally adequate habilitation," it at 1323, "freedom from harm," id. at 1321, "nondiscrimi-
natory habilitation," id., and "least restrictive setting for habilitation," id. at 1319.
150 Id. at 1325-26. The federal statute relied on was § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
see supra note 147.
' 5 ' 612 F.2d at 100. The district court had not based its holding on this federal statute. See
supra note 150. The court of appeals also affirmed the district court in the alternative on state law.
612 F.2d at 103. The court of appeals modified the district court's order that the institution be
closed. Id. at 114-15.
154
	 U.S. at 18.
' 53
 451 U.S. at 30-31. The Court responded to plaintiff's argument that state grounds were
sufficient to affirm the court of appeals:
There are, however, two difficulties with that argument. First, the lower court's finding
that state law provides a right to treatment may well have been colored by its holding
with respect to § 6010. Second, the court held only that there is a right to "treatment,"
not that there is a state right to treatment in the "least restrictive" environment. As
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B. Pennhurst II: The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's remedies on the basis
of state law.' 54 In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit relied on the Pennsylvania
Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act as interpreted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in In re Schmidt. 155 The defendants raised for the first time on remand an eleventh
amendment objection to affirming relief on the basis of state law. 15" The court of appeals
rejected defendants' eleventh amendment argument, finding the eleventh amendment
no bar in this case. 157 According to the court, the relief in this case was permissible under
the eleventh amendment doctrines of Ex parte Youngm and Edelman,' 59 because this suit
was against numerous state officials 1 " and sought only prospective injunctive relief. 161
The effects on the state itself, following from an injunction issued against these officials,
were ancillary. 162 Therefore, the court found, no part of those facts contravened the
established doctrines of the eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity. 16 '
In addition to arguing that the district court's remedies exceeded the permissible
limits under the eleventh amendment, the defendants also argued that the eleventh
amendment precluded a federal court from deciding a case on the basis of a pendent
state law claim.'" The Third Circuit traced the history of the interpretation of the
eleventh amendment, noting that it had first been given an expansive reading in the
post-Reconstruction era in response to political and economic pressures. 165 Soon there-
such, it is unclear whether state law provides an independent and adequate ground
which can support the court's remedial order. Accordingly, we remand the state-law
issue for reconsideration in light of our decision here.
Id. In addition, the Court noted that a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, rendered after
the decision of the court of appeals, had held that Pennsylvania state law required habilitation in
the least restrictive environment for a mentally retarded adult plaintiff. Id. at 31 n.24 (lojr, remand
following our reversal, the Court of Appeals will be in a position to consider the state-law issues in
light of the Pennsylvania's [sic] Supreme Court's recent decision") (citing In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86,
429 A.2d 631 (1981)).
154 See supra note 148.
w 673 F.2d at 661.
' 56 Id. at 656. Although not always treated as a jurisdictional question, courts have held that an
eleventh amendment objection to federal court jurisdiction "sufficiently partakes of the nature of
a jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651,678 (1974). See also Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,466-67 (1945).
In the first appeal from the district court in Pennhurst I, the defendants raised an eleventh amend-
ment challenge to the relief granted by the district court, arguing that the relief led directly to the
expenditure of state funds. The court of appeals rejected this challenge, finding the relief permis-
sible as prospective injunctive relief, citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), and Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 612 F.2d at 109. The defendants did not raise an eleventh amendment
challenge in the Supreme Court in Pennhurst I. See Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. at 10-11.
u 673 F.2d at 659.
15" See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
159 The Pennhurst State School & Hospital and the State Department of Public Health were
also named as defendants. See supra note 145.
161 673 F.2d at 656.
62 Id.
16, Id.
I " Id. at 657.
165 Id. at 659. Judge Gibbons, the author of' the opinion for the court of appeals, also wrote an
article expanding his views of the history of the eleventh amendment. See supra notes 61-67 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Judge Gibbons's article.
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after, the court reasoned, the Supreme Court "reconsidered" and held that a federal
court could entertain an action for injunctive relief against state officials sued in their
official capacities.' 66 This principle allowing injunctive relief against state officials was
not limited to constitutional claims, the court of appeals held.' 67 The court of appeals
found that this principle applied to pendent jurisdiction, a doctrine which permitted
federal courts to take jurisdiction over related state law claims where federal court
jurisdiction is established by a federal question.' 68 In Siler P. Louisville & Nashville
the court reasoned, the Supreme Court had upheld an injunction against the state
railroad commission on the grounds that they had exceeded their state statutory au-
thority.'" The justification for pendent jurisdiction in Mier, according to the court of
appeals, had been to avoid unnecessarily reaching constitutional questions.'" The court
of appeals found the goal of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions controlling in
this case, especially considered in light of the Supreme Court's instructions to reconsider
the state law grounds.'" Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed on the basis of the
Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act. 17 °
C. Pennhurst II: The Supreme Court
The Supreme Court again granted certiorari, and in a five to four decision, again
reversed the court of appeals, holding that the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal
court from issuing an injunction against state officials on the basis of state law.'" Rea-
soning that the eleventh amendment embodies a broad, constitutional sovereign im-
munity for the states,'" the Court held that pendent jurisdiction is insufficient to over-
come the constitutional sovereign immunity granted to the states by the eleventh
amend ment. L76
1. The Majority Opinion
Justice Powell, writing for the majority,'" began by examining the adoption and
interpretation of the eleventh amendment. The true significance of the eleventh amend-
ment, the Court held, is that the article 111 grant of judicial power is limited by the
'06 673 F.2d at 657 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
167 1d, at 658.
168 Id.
' 62 213 U.S. 175 (1909). The court of appeals reasoned that Siler must he considered in
interpreting the Young doctrine, since it was decided one year after Ex parte Young, and both opinions
were written by Justice Peckham. 673 F.2d at 658.
' 7° 673 F.2d at 657-58.
171 Id. at 658 (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175, 193 (1909)). This doctrine
of avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions was expressed in the frequently cited case, Ash-
wander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
"2 673 F.2d at 658-59 (referring to Pennhurst 1, 451 U.S. at 31 n.24). "Moreover, even if the
Commonwealth's unique interpretation of the pendent jurisdiction rule as inapplicable to suits
against state officers had any substance, the Court's express mandate that we reconsider the state
law issue appears to preclude its adoption in this case by this Court." Id. at 659.
175 1d. at 661.
1 " 465 U.S. at 121-23.
"5 1d, at 98, 102-03.
"6 Id. at 121.
"2 Chief justice Burger, and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined Justice Powell in
the majority opinion.
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fundamental principle of sovereign immunity.'" In this light, the Court reasoned, the
protection of the eleventh amendment applies beyond its literal terms.'" Relying on this
broad interpretation of the eleventh amendment, the Court concluded that sovereign
immunity is a constitutionally required limitation on federal judicial power. 180
Having held that state sovereign immunity is constitutionally required, the Court
then considered the scope of a state's immunity. While a state may waive its immunity
to suit in federal court, the Court noted, a state's consent to suit must be clearly ex-
pressed. 181 In addition, while Congress has power to abrogate a state's immunity to
vindicate rights protected by the fourteenth amendment, congressional intent must also
be unequivocal. 182 Furthermore, the Court noted that a state's immunity protects both
whether and where it may be sued; although a state may waive its immunity in its own
courts, that waiver does not by itself lift the constitutional bar against suit in federal
courts.'" These principles, the Court concluded, reflect the vital role sovereign immunity
plays in the federal system. '"' The Court held, therefore, that the principles of federalism
behind the eleventh amendment must guide the Court's decision.'"
The eleventh amendment bar to suits against states, the Court held, extends to any
suit in which the state itself or one of its agencies is named as the defendant, regardless
of the nature of the relief sought. 186 A suit against state officials, the Court noted, raises
a question of whether the suit is in fact one against the state.'" While finding the
precedent inconsistent, the Court found an established principle that where the state is
the real, substantial party in interest — where the effect of the suit, regardless of the
nature of the damages asked, is on the state — the suit is against the state for purposes
of the eleventh amendment.'"
The only exception to the broad bar of eleventh amendment sovereign immunity,
the Court held, is the fiction of Ex parte Young, which allows suit in federal court against
state officials for the vindication of constitutional rights.' 89 The Court reasoned that this
exception is a narrow one, solely for the enforcement of federal rights and to assure the
supremacy of federal law. 190 Furthermore, the Court noted, limitations on available relief
have sharply restricted the application of this narrow exception. L91
I" Id. at 97. In addition to overturning Chisholm, the Court held, the eleventh amendment
represents the broader principle of state sovereign immunity. Id.
178 Id. at 96-98 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (federal court has no jurisdiction
in a suit against a state by a citizen of the same state), and Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313
(1934) (federal court has no jurisdiction in a suit against a state by a foreign state)). See supra notes
92-99,118 and accompanying text.
ISO 465 U.S. at 98,
u" Id. at 99 (citing Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673).
182 Id, (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bluer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,
342 (1979)). The Court did not discuss Congress's power to abrogate a state's immunity in other
realms of congressional authority, such as the commerce clause.
1 " 465 U.S. at 99 n.9.
im Id. at 99.
,85 Id. at 100.
In Id.
," Id. at 101.
188 Id. at 101-02 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,464 (1945)).
mg Id. at 102 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). See supra notes 103-16 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.
19° 465 U.S. at 102.
191 Id. (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)). See supra notes 124-30 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of this case.
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Having defined the contours of the eleventh amendment doctrines, the Court ap-
plied those doctrines to the state law claims presented. Because the eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity protects the state, the Court noted, the initial question is whether
the suit is against the state.'" The Court rejected plaintiffs' contention that the suit was
permissible because the remedy was limited to prospective injunctive relief.'" The Court
reasoned that the Young fiction was an exception to the eleventh amendment bar only
to vindicate federal rights and to assure the supremacy of federal law.' 91 State-created
rights presented no compelling need to carve out exceptions to the eleventh amendment
immunity of the states.'" Therefore, the Court held, the fiction of Ex parte Young, that
a suit against the state official is not a suit against the state, may only be employed to
vindicate federal rights, and not to enforce state law. 196
Having rejected the use of the fiction that the suit was not against the state where
state law was violated, the Court considered whether there was any other basis to conclude
that the suit was against the individual officials only, and not the state.'" The Court
noted that the relief ordered by the district court was institutional and official in char-
acter, rather than directed at the officials as individuals.'" Indeed, the Court noted, the
district court found that the officials had "acted in the utmost good faith ... within the
sphere of their official responsibilities," and were thus not personally liable for dam-
ages.'" The Court held that a suit against an official is not a suit against the state only
if the official acts beyond the authority granted by the state. 2" A claim that the officer
misapplied the state law, the Court continued, was insufficient to override the sovereign
immunity of the state 20 '
Finally, the Court considered whether the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction might
enable the relief affirmed by the court of appeals on the basis of state law to escape the
bar of eleventh amendment sovereign immunity. 202 The Court posed the question as
whether the judge-made doctrine of pendent jurisdiction displaced the eleventh amend-
ment's explicit, constitutional limitation on federal jurisdiction. 203 The Court rejected
prior cases which had granted relief against state officials on the basis of state law,
holding that they had not confronted the question directly. 204 In addition, the Court
'" 465 U.S. at 103.
' 95 Id. at 106. The plaintiffs contended that Ex parte Young and Edelman held that a suit against
a state official is not a suit against the state where the state official acts contrary to law (federal or
state) and relief is limited to prospective relief. See infra notes 229-62 and accompanying text for
a discussion of this analysis in Justice Stevens's dissent.
' 94 465 U.S. at 105-06.
'" Id. at 106.
LOS Id.
197
198 Id. at 108.
' 99 Id. (citing 446 F. Supp. at 1324).
2°° Id. at 112 n.22, 113-14 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S.
682 (1949)).
20, Id, at 112.
2" Id. at 117.
205 1d. at 118.
Id. at 118-19. The Court held the question an open one, reasoning "when questions of
jurisdiction have been passed on in prior decisions sub silenlio, this Court has never considered itself
bound when a subsequent case finally brings the jurisdictional issue before us." Id. at 119 (citing
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 533 n.5 (1974)).
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rejected the "implicit view" of previous cases that the federal question which established
jurisdiction resolved any problems raised by the eleventh amendment, and that pendent
state law claims raised no new eleventh amendment problems. 205 Instead, the Court held,
a federal court must examine each claim presented to determine whether it satisfies the
requirements of the eleventh amendment. 2°6
Pendent jurisdiction is insufficient to overcome the explicit, constitutional bar against
jurisdiction represented by the eleventh amendment, the Court held. 207 The basis for
the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, whether interpreting "case" as used in article 111, 200
or avoiding deciding constitutional questions, 209 amounted to a Judge-made doctrine of
expediency and efficiency." 21 ° Pointing out that the eleventh amendment acts as an
independent limitation on all exercises of federal judicial power, the Court concluded
that the amendment's bar could not be overcome by pendent jurisdiction. 2 "
In holding that federal courts may not hear claims against state officials on the basis
of state law, the Court recognized that plaintiffs might be forced to split their claims
between federal and state court, or to forego the federal forum to have their claims
heard together. 212 The Court also recognized that efficiency might be impaired and
constitutional questions might not be avoided. 213 Nevertheless, the Court held that these
policy considerations could not overcome the constitutional bar to jurisdiction found in
the eleventh amendment. 214
The eleventh amendment protection extended to state officials does not extend to
county officials, the Court observed. 235 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned, the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction to permit a federal court to hear state claims against those county
officials depends on considerations of efficiency, fairness, and convenience. 216 In this
case, the Court held, an injunction against the county officials alone would be ineffective
and incomplete. 217 Therefore, the Court held that the exercise of the discretionary
doctrine of pendent jurisdiction to hear state law claims against the county officials in
this case was not warranted. 2 "
The Court thus reversed the decision of the court of appeals on all claims before
it. 219 The other claims raised in the district court, based on the Constitution and a federal
205 Id. The Court referred to Siler v. Louisville Sc Nashville R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909), Greene
v. Louisville & Interurban R:R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917), and Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Greene,
244 U.S. 522 (1917). 465 U.S. at 118.
288 465 U.S. at 121.
207 Id.
208 See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 819-23 (1824); see
also United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
209 See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Slier, 213 U.S. at 193.
210 465 U.S. at 120.
"' Id. at 121.
212 Id. at 121-22.
213 Id. at 122-23.
214 Id. at 123.
218 Id. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977); Lincoln
County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890).
216 465 U.S. at 124.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 125.
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statute, were not properly before the Court because the court of appeals in Pennhurst II
had based its decision solely on state law. 22° Therefore, the Court remanded the case for
consideration of whether the remedy granted by the district court could be upheld on
the basis of the remaining federal statute, or under the eighth and fourteenth amend-
ments of the U.S. Constitution. 2"
2. The Dissenting Opinions
In a short dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan adhered to an interpretation of the
eleventh amendment which restricts its operation to its literal language, leaving a separate
and distinct doctrine of sovereign immunity to be applied by the courts. 222 In Justice
Brennan's view, the eleventh amendment is a narrow jurisdictional bar to be applied
only within its literal terms. 223 Sovereign immunity, Justice Brennan argued, is a distinct,
non-constitutional doctrine which is not rooted in the eleventh amendment. 224 It is the
non-constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity, Justice Brennan contended, under
which a state is immune from suit by its own citizens. 225 The eleventh amendment had
no bearing in this case, Justice Brennan concluded, because there was no state-citizen
diversity. 226 Furthermore, the non-constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity did not
bar this suit because the state officials acted ultra vires in disobeying state law. 227 Ac-
cording to Justice Brennan, the judgment of the court of appeals should have been
affirmed. 223
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun. 229 Justice Stevens found the majority's position on the eleventh
amendment unprecedented, reasoning that Ink) rational view of the sovereign immunity
220 Id. at 124-25.
221 Id. at 125. The district court had issued its relief on constitutional, federal statutory, and
state law grounds. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. The court of appeals initially
affirmed on the Bill of Rights provision of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. On remand from the Supreme Court's
decision in Pennhurst I, see supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text, the court of appeals affirmed
the relief granted by the district court on the basis of state law support. See supra notes 154-73 and
accompanying text. Thus, the court of appeals had never considered the remaining federal statutory
and constitutional grounds for relief. Since the Court's decision in Pennhurst II, the parties have
settled the case. See New York Times, April 6, 1985, at 6, col. 5; New York Times, July 15, 1984,
at 18, col. 3.
2" 465 U.S. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also joined in the dissenting
opinion by Justice Stevens. Id. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan incorporated by
reference his opinions in Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
228
	 U.S. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
244
225 Id. at 125-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan has argued that the Court in Hans
applied a non-constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 320-21 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
226 465 U.S. at 125 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227 Id. at 126 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228 1d.
"9 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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of the States supports this result." 2" Justice Stevens also found that the majority reversed
the court of appeals for doing what the Court ordered it to do in Pennhurst /PI Good
faith on the part of the officials, which the majority stressed, had no bearing on whether
suit against the officials was permissible under the eleventh amendment, Justice Stevens
argued.252 Moreover, Justice Stevens noted, good faith immunity from damage suits is
not applicable to injunctive relief. 2" Justice Stevens concluded that the majority aban-
doned an established, simple rule that federal courts may enjoin state officials whose
conduct exceeds the scope of authorized discretion. 234
Justice Stevens then considered eleventh amendment state sovereign immunity in a
broader context. The eleventh amendment has not been limited to its literal terms,
Justice Stevens noted, and instead stands for a broader notion of sovereign immunity. 2"
The proper focus of inquiry, he contended, is on the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
rather than the eleventh amendment itself. 2" To place this doctrine of sovereign im-
munity in its historical context, Justice Stevens traced the development of the doctrine
from its roots in Englanc1. 2" Even under a monarchy, Justice Stevens found, sovereign
immunity did not mean that government officials were immune from suit. 2" Rather,
according to Justice Stevens, the doctrine of sovereign immunity historically meant only
that the unlawful acts of the King's agents were not considered to be the acts of the
sovereign. 239
Relying on the historical interpretation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, Justice
Stevens reasoned that the pivotal question in a sovereign immunity analysis is whether
the action complained of is the action of the sovereign state or of the agent. 24° This
2" Id.
231 Id. Justice Stevens wrote, "the only error committed by the Court of Appeals was its faithful
obedience to this Court's command." Id. Justice Stevens contended that the majority overruled a
long line of cases in which federal courts had issued injunctions based on state law. Id. at 130-39
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Among the cases Justice Stevens discussed are Florida Dep't of State v.
Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982) (injunction against state for return of property with-
held); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982) (eleventh amendment barred executor of Howard Hughes
estate from filing statutory interpleader in federal court to resolve conflicting domicile claims of
California and Texas); Johnson v. Lankford, 245 U.S. 541 (1918) (no immunity for bank commis-
sioner who acted in negligent or willful disregard of his duties, failure to safeguard assets of bank);
Greene v. Louisville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917) (federal court may enjoin state official
from proceeding to collect unconstitutional tax); Scully v. Bird, 209 U.S. 481 (1908) (injunction
issued against state official who acted under color of office to injure plaintiff's business); Reagan
v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390-91 (1894) (no immunity for state official for
commission of state law tort); Rolston v. Missouri Fund Commissioners, 120 U.S. 390 (1887)
(injunction may issue to require officer to do what a statute requires of him in transferring funds
to a sinking fund for state bond repurchase). From these cases, Justice Stevens concluded that a
state official has no discretion to violate the laws of either the state or federal government. 465 U.S.
at 138 n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 465 U.S. at 138-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23s
	 at 139 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
234 Id.
233 Id. at 140-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), and
Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)).
236 Id. at 141-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"7 Id. at 142-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236 Id.
239 Id.
24° Id. at 143-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
972	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:947
distinction between the sovereign and its agents is firmly embedded in our law, Justice
Stevens reasoned, and focusing on this issue is in accord with the precedent."' The
majority's holding is flawed, Justice Stevens argued, in extending overly broad sovereign
immunity protection to officials, and allowing suit against state officials only for violations
of federal law.242 This formulation, he argued, reduced the doctrine allowing suit against
state officials for unconstitutional conduct to "an unprincipled accommodation." 2" In-
stead, Justice Stevens contended, an analysis which focuses on the established doctrines
separating actions of the agent from those of the sovereign is in accord with both the
principles contained in the eleventh amendment and its precedent. 244
Because the pivotal question is whether the acts of the agent are the acts of the
sovereign, Justice Stevens asserted, when an agent acts contrary to law, it does not matter
whether that law is state or federal."' The interest of the sovereign state, Justice Stevens
contended, lies in the enforcement of its own law. 246 Prior cases did not distinguish
violations of the federal constitution from violations of state law, he noted, and treated
the Constitution as part of the state's law rather than as a separate entity."' Furthermore,
Justice Stevens continued, the states adopted the eleventh amendment because they
feared that federal courts would force them to pay their Revolutionary War debts; an
injunction in this case is not the same threat to the state treasury. 2" Finally, a decision
based on state law is less intrusive than one based on federal law, he reasoned, because
the state may change its own 1aw. 2" The states are bound by a decision based on federal
law, on the other hand, and are powerless to change it. 25° Thus, Justice Stevens con-
cluded, a decision based on state law is in accord with proper respect for the decision-
making capabilities of the states in the federal system. 251
Justice Stevens concluded that the same sovereign immunity analysis applied to
violations of state or federal law. 252 In essence, he stated, sovereign immunity is a shield
to protect the sovereign. Although a state may extend that shield to protect its agents
— its officials 255 — the shield is not absolute and unconditional. It is struck down when
the official contravenes the federal constitution, 254 and is not extended to protect an
official who commits a tort, 255 or acts outside his official authority. 256 In any of these
three situations, Justice Stevens concluded, the official is not protected by the shield of
state sovereign immunity. 257
24 ' Id. at 145-46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
242 1d.
245 Id. at 146-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
244
 Id. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 146-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246 Id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
262 Id. at 147-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270,292-93
(1885)).
25" Id. at 151-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 150-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252 Id,
256 Id. at 158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
251 Id .
255 Id.
256 Id,
257 Id. at 158-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In addition to misapplying established principles of sovereign immunity, Justice
Stevens argued, the majority also sacrificed the important policy of avoiding unnecessary
constitutional questions. 258 This policy, he contended, serves as an integral part of judicial
review. 259 Furthermore, he noted, adherence to this policy gives greater respect to the
application of state policy, which the states remain free to modify. 26° Neglecting this
important policy, Justice Stevens concluded, forces the federal courts to decide cases
unnecessarily on federal grounds. 2GE The majority, Justice Stevens charged, cast aside
the fundamental doctrines of the law of the case, stare decisis, sovereign immunity,
pendent jurisdiction, and judicial restraint, in a decision which amounted to a "voyage
into the sea of undisciplined lawmaking. "262
III. PENNHURST II AND ELEVENTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
A. The Constitutionalization of State Sovereign Immunity
The Court in Pennhurst 11 confronted the tension between granting the states broad
immunity from suit while allowing suits against individual officials. This tension is not,
however, an inevitable result of the eleventh amendment. It is the product of the Court's
interpretation of the source of state sovereign immunity and the scope of the eleventh
amendment.
In Pennhurst II, the majority interpreted sovereign immunity to provide broad
protection to the states from suit, and rooted the requirement of state sovereign im-
munity in the Constitution. 262 Interpreting the eleventh amendment as a constitutional
requirement was an important part of the Court's holding that pendent jurisdiction
could not override the states' immunity. 264 The Court thus applied an immunity broader
than the terms of the eleventh amendment, while holding the eleventh amendment itself
required this broad protection.
The flaw in the Court's holding in Pennhurst H is twofold. First, the Court in Pennhurst
II neglected to distinguish sovereign immunity as a general doctrine protecting govern-
mental actions from the unique limits imposed by federalism on the federal judiciary's
power over the states. Instead, the Court presented a single doctrine of state sovereign
immunity which it purported to apply to all issues brought against states in federal
courts. Second, compounding this confusion, the Court held that this broad state sov-
ereign immunity was required by the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on abstract notions of sovereignty and a historically inaccurate conception of the
understanding of the framers of the Constitution and the eleventh amendment. 265 The
result is a confusing and inconsistent body of law.
258 Id. at 159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 Id. (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring), and &ler, 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909)).
260 Id. at 163 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
26]
262 Id. at 165-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded as he had begun, with the
statement, "this case has illuminated the character of an institution." Id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
262 465 U.S. at 98.
264 Id. at 117- 18.
263 Id. at 98-99.
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The constitutionalization of this confused doctrine of state sovereign immunity has
important, but very subtle effects. First, identifying a constitutional source for this
doctrine of broad state sovereign immunity makes modification and refinement of the
doctrines more difficult and less likely. Second, the Court applied this doctrine rigidly,
finding it to be an "explicit limitation" required by the Constitution." This rigid appli-
cation is unwarranted, given the historical uncertainty of the eleventh amendment's
meaning and the Court's merger of governmental immunity and the limits on federal
judicial power over states in the federal system. Finally, the weight given this constitu-
tionalized doctrine of state sovereign immunity and the Court's rigid application of this
doctrine deflect consideration of the issues of federalism raised by the eleventh amend-
ment. As a result, the Court's holding in Pennhurst II will distort the analysis and
development of the eleventh amendment's requirements.
The constitutionalization of a broad state sovereign immunity in Pennhurst II was
not a sharp break with the Court's prior holdings. The fusion of sovereign immunity
with the limits imposed by the federal structure on the power of the federal courts
developed gradually since the Court first expanded state immunity in Hans.267 Although
the term "sovereign immunity" does not appear in the text of the eleventh amendment,'"
the Court's decisions have nevertheless read sovereign immunity into the eleventh
amendment, ignoring that governmental immunity from individual suit is distinct from
limits on the federal judiciary's power over states. The fusion of these distinct doctrines
distorts the application of each. For example, much of the Court's decision in Pennhurst
II relies on a case involving the sovereign immunity of the federal government from suit
by an individual. 269 This governmental immunity, which imposes limits on the ability of
individuals to sue the federal government, has no explicit constitutional source.") An
individual's suit against a state government raises similar issues of the degree to which
the government allows itself to be sued. Federal sovereign immunity, however, has no
relation to the issues of federalism involved in federal court jurisdiction over suits against
states. Nevertheless, the Court in Pennhurst II did not distinguish these different kinds
of immunity. As a result, the Court slips from governmental accountability to federalism
without differentiating them."'
Identifying the source of this broad sovereign immunity applied by the Court has
been an area of great confusion in prior cases. 272 In general, the Court has agreed that
state sovereign immunity is required by the Constitution. The Court has generally
followed the traditional view that there was a general understanding of state sovereign
immunity which Chisholm violated, prompting adoption of the eleventh amendment to
overturn the Court's "mistake" in Chisho/m. 2" Even with this understanding, however,
2" Id. at 118.
267 See supra notes 90-118 and accompanying text.
268 See supra note 58.
269 465 U.S. at 112 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949)).
279 Justice Frankfurter, criticizing the Court's holding in Larson upholding federal sovereign
immunity, stated, "fah to the States, legal irresponsibility was written into the Constitution by the
Eleventh Amendment; as to the United States, it is derived by implication." 337 U.S. 682, 708
(1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
271 See, e.g., 465 U.S. at 99-100.
272 See, e.g., Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973), in which
the majority opinion, Justice Marshall's concurring opinion, and Justice Brennan's dissenting opin-
ion differ on the source of state sovereign immunity.
278 See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
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these prior cases were unclear on whether the eleventh amendment merely restored the
original understanding or imposed a new constitutional requirement of state sovereign
immunity. 274 Even if the eleventh amendment restored an original understanding, these
cases did not clearly hold whether that understanding was that article [II did not abrogate
common law sovereign immunity, or imposed a new constitutional requirement of state
sovereign immunity.275
Despite these difficulties, the Court in Pennhurst II held that broad state sovereign
immunity is required by the Constitution without precisely establishing its constitutional
foundation. Justice Stevens, in dissent, approached the issue with a slightly different
focus. Noting that the eleventh amendment is applied beyond its terms, he concluded
that the proper focus was on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 2" The eleventh
amendment, he argued, "incorporated" and "embodied" the "traditional sovereign im-
munity of the•States." 277 Justice Stevens's approach to the eleventh amendment is thus
to read past its terms, interpreting its language only as a repudiation of the decision in
Chisholm. Justice Stevens's opinion is unclear, however, whether the eleventh amendment
restores a pre-existing immunity or imposes a new immunity. 2" Neither the majority
opinion nor Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, therefore, illuminates the discussion of
the source of state sovereign immunity. As a result, neither opinion deals with the
principles which lie behind state sovereign immunity in the federal system.
Only Justice Brennan follows an approach which would limit the application of the
eleventh amendment and consider a separate doctrine of state sovereign immunity. 279
Since 1973,299 Justice Brennan has tried without success to convince the Court to limit
the application of the eleventh amendment to its literal terms. Justice Brennan argues
that the eleventh amendment is a narrow restriction on state-citizen diversity jurisdic-
tion. 281 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan maintains, a separate, non-constitutional doctrine
of sovereign immunity exists. 2 B2 It is this non-constitutional doctrine of sovereign im-
munity which Justice Brennan applies in concurring with Justice Stevens's opinion in
Pennhurst H. 299 In limiting the eleventh amendment to its terms and reasoning that a
separate, non-constitutional doctrine of sovereign immunity exists, however, Justice
Brennan does not consider whether the federal structure imposes limits on federal
judicial power over the states."
274 See supra note 272.
275
	
Employees v. Department of Pub. Health Sc Welfare, 411 U.S. at 280 n.1 (immunity
doctrine "embodied in the Eleventh Amendment"), with id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (state
immunity derived from traditional, non-constitutional principles).
276
	
U.S. at 140-41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277 Id.
278 See id.
279 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 125-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 687
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 320
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan presented his most complete interpretation of the elev-
enth amendment in a case decided after Pennhurst II. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105
S. Ct. 3142,3150 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28° See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. at 298 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
281 Id. at 320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2142 Id.
288 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 125-26 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
284 in Atascadero Stale Hosp. v. Scanlon, Justice Brennan rejected the argument that state sover-
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Despite the confusion which has permeated eleventh amendment analysis, the un-
derlying issues of federalism may nevertheless be observed in the case law. For example,
the issues of federal structure are clear in cases which, while maintaining state sovereign
immunity broader than the terms of the eleventh amendment, permit suits against states
by the United States 285 and by sister states. 286 In addition, the Court has allowed a state
to be sued without its consent in the courts of a sister state. 287 Furthermore, while
purporting to apply a broad state sovereign immunity, the Court has maintained the
fiction that a suit against a state official for unconstitutional actions is not a suit against
a state in order to assure the supremacy of federal law, the foundation of federalism. 288
The concerns of federalism are also evident in the limitations on remedies the Court
has imposed when the Young fiction is employed. Limitations on damages and retroactive
injunctive relief protect the state's fiscal stability and autonomy. 289 Finally, the Court's
rejection of the Edelman distinction between retroactive and prospective relief as the
litmus test of permissible suits against states suggests recognition that the Court's eleventh
amendment doctrines inadequately serve the underlying concerns of federalism. 290
The Court's failure to address separately the issues underlying governmental im-
munity and federalism while rigidly applying a constitutionalized broad state sovereign
immunity results in a confused and inflexible doctrine of state immunity in the federal
courts. State immunity is better approached from a consideration of how states fit into
the federal structure as autonomous decisionmaking bodies. In certain circumstances,
immunity may be implied from the federal structure. 291 In other circumstances, the
federal structure requires that state immunity be abrogated. 292 Distinct policies support
eign immunity is required by the federal structure. 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3171 n.41, 3178 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent focused on whether state immunity is required
by the federal structure, and did not consider whether that structure might otherwise impose limits
on federal judicial power over the states.
288 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965).
286 See North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 372-73 (1923). Compare South Dakota v. North
Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904) (state may sue on its own behalf on defaulted bonds issued by another
state), with New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883) (state may not sue another state on
defaulted bonds where suit is on behalf of individual citizens).
287 Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421 (1979).
288 Although the majority limits the doctrine of Ex parte Young, it does not dispense with it.
Pennhursi II, 465 U.S. at 105-06. But see id. at 104 n.13 ("(wle do not decide whether the District
Court would have jurisdiction under this reasoning [under Ex parte Young and Edelman] to grant
prospective relief on the basis of federal law"); id. at 146-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (majority treats
Ex parte Young as an "unprincipled accommodation between federal and state interests that ignores
the principles contained in the Eleventh Amendment"). Because it assures the supremacy .of federal
law, Ex parte Young is frequently cited as a seminal case in establishing federal judicial power in the
federal system. See, e.g., WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 110, § 4231, at 352. "Indeed it is
not extravagant to argue that Ex parte Young is one of the three most important decisions the
Supreme Court of the United States has ever handed down." Id.
289 See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
299 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 104-05 & n.13. Justice Blackmun has compared the Court's
constitutionalization of broad state sovereign immunity through the eleventh amendment to the
recently overruled holding of National League of Cities v. Usery; both "gave broad scope to circum-
scribed language by reference to principles of federalism said to inform that language." Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3179 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
291 See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 430 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id, at 441
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
292 See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
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the separate issue of governmental immunity in general. For example, individual im-
munity for legislators and judges has survived without being rooted in explicit terms in
the Constitution. 295 By focusing instead on abstract notions of sovereignty, the Court has
afforded to the states an immunity 'broader than had ever been enjoyed by the king of
England,"294 at the same time that states are increasingly involved in areas beyond their
traditional governmental functions.
Recent commentators have challenged the Court's interpretation of the eleventh
amendment's historical purpose and its proper role in the federal system. The Court's
assumptions about the amendment's adoption are faulty, these commentators contend,
and the Court's subsequent interpretation has drifted from the central issues. 295 Most
important, these commentators offer new structures for analyzing state sovereign im-
munity in the federal system. These new perspectives, although of limited impact to
date, suggest important directions for the future course of eleventh amendment analysis.
By carefully defining the scope of the eleventh amendment, these commentators restore
the focus on the fundamental issue of federalism.
Professor Fletcher has argued that the eleventh amendment serves only to restrict
article 1I I's grant of state-citizen diversity jurisdiction to those cases in which a state is
the plaintiff. 296 The effect of Professor Fletcher's interpretation of the eleventh amend-
ment is to clarify and simplify the analysis of the amendment's reach. This clarification
is achieved by separating the explicit but narrow bar of the eleventh amendment from
the broader issues of state sovereign immunity in the federal system; mixing them clouds
the analysis.297
According to Professor Fletcher, the broader issues of state sovereign immunity are
based on questions of national power and federal structure. 298 The Court's analysis of
state sovereign immunity should, therefore, focus on these issues rather than confusing
the analysis with separate conceptions of sovereignty and the eleventh amendment's
requirements. Professor Fletcher proposed an inquiry based on an analysis of the par-
ticular clause under which national power is exerted over the states. 299 Only by focusing
on the particular national power can the place of that power in the federal structure be
analyzed, he concluded. 900 Professor Fletcher's analysis is based on an inquiry into the
299
	 e.g., lmbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutor acting
within scope of discretion); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (absolute immunity for judges);
Tenney v. Rrandhove, 341 U.S. 367, '372-75 (1951) (absolute immunity for legislators).
994 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 146 n.30 (Stevens, j., dissenting).
295 See C. incoxs, supra note 46, at 40; Field, supra note 7, at 534; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation,
supra note 3, at 40; Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1913; Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441; Tribe, supra note
8, at 693.
295 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1035. judge Gibbons contends that the
eleventh amendment. removed all state-citizen diversity jurisdiction from the article III grant.
Gibbons, supra note 3, at 1937. Both agree, however, that the eleventh amendment does not apply
to suits in federal court under another head of jurisdiction, such as a federal question. Fletcher,
Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1036; Gibbons, .tiara note 3, at 1937.
292 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1037.
292 Id.
299 /d. at 1118-20.
300
 Id. This analysis may then take into account the different role of national power in the
federal structure when the national power is exerted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment, see
id. at 1120-22 (citing Milliken v. Bradley (11), 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (eleventh amendment no bar to
injunction against Michigan Governor to pay share of costs of remedial desegregation of schools));
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inherent limitations of the grants of federal power rather than limits on federal court
jurisdiction contained in the eleventh amendment."' The relative interests of the national
and state governments depend on the power exerted, Professor Fletcher asserted, and
the Court's decisions would benefit front straightforward consideration of these issues.'"
Professor Nowak and Professor Tribe have each suggested an alternative analysis,
interpreting the eleventh amendment as a limitation on the power of the federal judi-
ciary, but not the power of Congress to subject the states to suit. 3" Professor Tribe
argued that the correct interpretation of the eleventh amendment is that article III did
not, of its own force, abrogate the sovereign immunity of the states. 3°4 The language of
the amendment limits construction, a judicial function, Professor Tribe contended,
without limiting the power of Congress. 30 Therefore, according to Professor Tribe,
Congress may abrogate the immunity of the states pursuant to its article I powers.""
Professor Nowak reached the same conclusion, relying in part on the colonists' fears of
federal court enforcement of state debts, particularly in suits brought by Tories. 4o7 The
eleventh amendment, Professor Nowak concluded, was not intended to reach Congres-
sional powers."'
Much of the argument of Professors Nowak and Tribe rests on the presumption
that, as a matter of structure, the concerns of federalism should be resolved by Congress,
in which the states are represented, and not by the courts, in which they are not."" The
Court's role, according to Professor Tribe, is to require a clear statement that Congress
the contract clause, see Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1122-24 (noting the special
concern of the enforcement of contracts against the states at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution); and the spending clause, see id. at 1124-27 (citing F,de/inan, 415 U.S. at 673 (Congress
had not made a sufficiently clear statement of intent to abrogate states' immunity for state partici-
pation in federal welfare program)).
3 ° 1 Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 3, at 1106. As a result of his analysis, Professor
Fletcher contends, the Court's doctrines distinguishing states from their subdivisions would he
placed in a larger context, and would better serve the current distribution of government. Id. at
1106-07.
3" Professor Fletcher noted that the results of the Court's prior decisions might not be different
under the analysis he suggests, but contends that the Court's reasoning and principles would be
clearer. Id. at 1131.
3°3 Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441; Tribe, supra note 8, at 693.
304 Tribe, supra note 8, at 693-94; see also Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441.
3° 3 Tribe, supra note 8, at 694. Professor Tribe quotes the eleventh amendment language: the
"judicial power ... shall not be [so] construed." Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. XI (editing by
Tribe)).
3" Id. at 694. Professor Tribe defined the limits of Congressional power to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of the states: Congress may not confer jurisdiction on an article III court
beyond the textual confines of article Ill; Congress must act pursuant to a power delegated to it
by article 1; finally, the tenth amendment provides a limit to how far Congress may intrude into
the autonomy of a state, affecting its integrity and ability to function. Id, at 696-97.
303
 Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441, 1428. In part, Professor Nowak relies on resolving Hamilton's
statements in TUE FEDERALIST No. 80 with those in No. 81. Nowak, supra note 8, at 1429. In
addition, Professor Nowak stresses the colonists' fears of suits by Tories. This may partially be a
result of the confusion about the facts of Chisholm — Nowak erroneously believed that Chisholm
sued on behalf of a British creditor. See supra note 51.
3" 3 Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441.
3" Tribe, supra note 8, at 695-96, 695 n.71; Nowak, supra note 8, at 1441. See Wechsler, The
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the Stales in the Composition and Selection of the National
Government, 54 CoLum. L. Rev. 543, 546 (1954).
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intended to abrogate the immunity of the states after considering the issues of federalism;
the further Congress infringes on state autonomy, the more careful consideration the
Court should require. 31° Both Professor Tribe and Professor Nowak reject reading the
eleventh amendment as a broad constitutional grant of state sovereign immunity, and
limit the amendment to the assertion that article III did not empower the federal
judiciary to subject the states to suit without the action of Congress.
These commentators have made an important step in suggesting analyses for the
application of the eleventh amendment and resolution of issues of federalism. In addi-
tion, the analysis of a state's immunity in federal court would be more clearly focused if
the Court considered what aspects of a state's autonomy were being protected from suit,
and the policies which support that protection. Assuring the supremacy of federal law
would not then be accomplished through the "unprincipled accommodation" 3" of the
fiction of Ex parte Young. Instead, the federal structure would define the boundaries of
the state's protection. The results of the cases might not change. The Court's current
approach, however, diverts attention from the fundamental questions of federalism
involved in the immunity granted to states in the federal system.
B. The Fiction of the Individual State Official and the Ultra Vires Doctrine
The Court in Pennhurst II held that a suit against a state official is not a suit against
the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment if the official acts beyond the authority
granted by the state. 312 Although the Court rejected the broader interpretation of the
ultra vires doctrine asserted by the dissent, 314 its holding nevertheless leaves open the
question whether the eleventh amendment will apply in a suit against a state official.
The Court's construction of the fiction of Ex parte Young, limiting it to federal claims,
creates a separate doctrine of ultra vires for claims against state officials not based on
federal law. The doctrine of ultra vires defines the reach of sovereign immunity, and is
a central issue in determining whether a state official may be sued in federal courts. The
Court's analysis in Pennhurst II, however, fails to clarify this doctrine.
Although sovereign immunity protects the state from suit, state officials are not
immune from suit for all of their actions. Private actions taken by an individual who
happens to be a state official are not protected by the state's immunity — the classic
example is the sale of an official's private house; the purchaser may sue to prevent the
official from conveying the house to a third person. 31 ' While this extreme is clear, the
3111
	
.supra note 8, at 695.
3 " Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 104-05 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1049)).
313 The ultra vires doctrine is an expression of the limit of official action, defining the boundary
between actions of an individual official in an official capacity and those in an individual capacity.
The term ultra vires is used to represent many different definitions of this boundary, and can
therefore he misleading. Within the issue of state immunity from suit, whether based on state
sovereign immunity, federalism, or the eleventh amendment, ultra vires is used to represent the
line between a suit against an individual and a suit against an official for actions within an official
capacity so that the concerns for state immunity from suit are implicated. This section explores the
various ways the Court formulates the definition of that line.
514 Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 106-17 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp.,
337 U.S. 682 (1949)).
313 See Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 689 (1949).
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boundary of permissible suits against individual officials is clouded. In Pennhurst 11, the
Court further clouded this issue with a mechanical approach to suits against state officials
and an overly restricted view of when suits against state officials are otherwise permissible.
The center of the debate between the majority and justice Stevens's dissent was whether
a state official whose actions violate state law was nonetheless protected by the state's
immunity from suit in federal court. The majority's analysis of this issue addressed only
the positive grant of authority to the state official, without considering the scope of the
official's discretion and the purpose and permissibility of the state's extension of im-
munity. The problem is one of focus. Instead of asking how far the state has extended
its immunity, the Court considered only the question of when the official is the state.
Distinguishing conduct of state officials which is protected by sovereign immunity
from unprotected actions is required unless the eleventh amendment and sovereign
immunity were held to apply only where the state is named as a party. 3 ' 6 Because the
state acts through its officials, some means must be available to distinguish those acts to
which the state's immunity extends. In early cases, the Court asked whether the effect
of the suit was against the states" Recently, the question is often posed from the other
angle — whether the official may be sufficiently pried away from the state to allow this
suit.''" Neither approach yields a satisfying test.
In Pennhurst 11, both the majority and dissenters agreed that unconstitutional actions
by a state official were not actions of the state for purposes of the eleventh amendment
and state sovereign immunity. 3 E 9 This creates the "irony" that state action is required
under the fourteenth amendment in order to raise the constitutional issue, and at the
same time, the action must be individual action in order to avoid the Court's application
of the eleventh amend ment. 32° The doctrine of Ex party Young,32 ' holding that unconsti-
tutional conduct of state officials is not conduct of the state for purposes of the eleventh
amendment, is frequently regarded as a fiction employed solely to assure the enforcea-
bility of federal law against state legislative and executive action. 322
Constitutional violations have not, however, been the only conduct for which federal
courts have permitted suit against stale officials. A long line of cases permitted suit where
the official's action amounts to a common law tort.m2 5 Permitting suit where a state official
commits a tort may be because torts are individual actions rather than the actions of the
sovereign. Alternatively, these suits may be permitted because of the requirement that a
lawsuit in the nineteenth century fit into a common law cause of action to raise the
plaintiff's legal claims. 324 Under this latter view, there is little cause for considering the
316
 Although Chief justice Marshall initially applied the eleventh amendment only to suits where
the state was named as a party, he later expanded that view to include a suit against a governor
sued in his official capacity. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
317 See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459,464 (1945); In re Ayers, 123
U.S. 443,487-92 (1887).
3 '" See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 665. Thus, the application of the Young doctrine allows a suit to
proceed against an individual official, but limitations are placed on remedies to minimize the
connection to the state. Id.
31 " See 465 U.S. at 102; id. at 158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32° Id. at 105. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 110, § 48, at 208.
32 ' 209 U.S. 123,159-60 (1908). See supra notes 103-16 and accompanying text.
' 22 See supra note 110.
323 See supra note 13 and cases cited therein.
529 In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,500-01 (1887). See supra notes 109-10.
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actions of the official not the actions of the sovereign merely because the action amounts
to a common law tort. As long as the Court focuses on whether the official is the
sovereign, allowing common law tort actions appears not to fit into a conceptual frame-
work. Indeed, the majority in Pennhurst II rests uneasily with these cases without resolving
their implications on the basis on which suit was permitted, reasoning only that a prior
case had limited them."'
The major focus of the debate between the majority and dissent in Pennhurst II
became the other means by which an official is separated from the state, the doctrine of
ultra vires, which recognizes that there is some limit to the immunity granted to offi-
cials. 326 The majority in Pennhurst II limited that doctrine to actions beyond the authority
granted to the official." 7 The majority would thus allow suit against state officials in two
circumstances: when the action of the official is beyond his authority, and when the
action is in conflict with federal law, in which case the fiction of Ex parte Young allows
suit to vindicate supreme federal law."8
Justice Stevens's dissent reconciles the different circumstances in which a suit is
allowed against an official under a unified theory of ultra vires. To Justice Stevens, the
doctrine of Ex parte Young is an integral part of the doctrine, rather than the majority's
"unprincipled accommodation." 329 Justice Stevens treats sovereign immunity as a shield
protecting the official. The shield is.either not extended in the first place, or struck
down in those situations in which a suit is allowed against the official. Justice Stevens's
dissent relies heavily on prior cases, and the borrowings from agency law they contained.
Fundamental in Pennhurst II was the question of whether an official who acts in a way
the state has forbidden is protected by that state's immunity. 39° To Justice Stevens, the
answer is clear — the state's interests are served by giving effect to its prohibitions, for
the state has itself prohibited that official action."'
The pivotal issue in Pennhurst II, then, was whether an official who acts contrary to
state law is protected by that state's sovereign immunity. Under the majority's position,
protection depends on whether the action was within the official's authority."" What
seems a clear distinction is blurred, however, because the majority considers only positive
grants of power to the official, and not independent limitations on that power." The
dissent unifies the issue by considering whether the official is protected by the state
"shield" of sovereign immunity, considering the official's actions in a broader context."'
Both the majority and dissent approach sovereign immunity as a broad, abstract
notion. As a result, neither considers the aspects of government that the doctrine pro-
tects. First, immunity protects government decisionmaking ability by allowing govern-
mental decisions to be made through specified channels, and by leaving to the govern-
325 465 U.S. at 109 n.19 (citing Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 357 U.S. 682
(1949)).
326 Id. at 106-17; id. at 140-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
3 v 7 Id. at 101 n. i 1.
328 1d. at 102, 112 n.22.
322 Id. at 147 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33° Id. at 150-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
33 ' Id.
332 Id. at 112 n.22.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 158-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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meat the fiscal consequences of its acts. 3" The role this doctrine plays may change over
time as notions of governmental accountability change. In this respect, state sovereign
immunity is like federal sovereign immunity. Second, state sovereign immunity plays a
special role in the federal system as a method of protecting the decisionmaking autonomy
of the states from the federal government. In this respect, state sovereign immunity is
a unique doctrine, governed by considerations more akin to tenth amendment federalism
issues."
As a result of its failure to identify the purpose served by state sovereign immunity,
the Court's discussion of whether a suit is against an individual official or the state is an
abstract exercise which fails to clarify when a suit may be brought. The majority gives
the Young doctrine limited effect, but is not able to reconcile suits allowed against officials
for actions beyond their authority or torts. 337
 As the dissent correctly points out, these
all fit under the broad heading of the ultra vires doctrine . 338 The dissent does not,
3" See generally Byse, Proposed Reforms in Federal"Nonstatutory"Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensable Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1962).
"i The close relationship with considerations of tenth amendment federalism is reflected in
the history of applying the minimum wage requirement of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) to state employees, In Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279
(1973), the Court held that the doctrine of implied waiver would not be applied to require state
operated hospitals to comply with FLSA.
It is not easy to infer that Congress in legislating pursuant to the Commerce Clause,
which has grown to vast proportions in its applications, desired silently to deprive the
States of an immunity they have long enjoyed under another part of the Constitution.
Thus, we cannot conclude that Congress conditioned the operation of these facilities
on the forfeiture of immunity from suit in is federal forum.
Id. at 285. The Court also emphasized the distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions in distinguishing Parden. Id. at 284 (distinguishing Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184
(1964)). See also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
In response to the Court's holding, Congress amended the FLSA to extend the minimum wage
provisions explicitly to state employees. The Court held the extension unconstitutional in National
League of Cities v. Usery, reasoning that Congress could not exercise the commerce power in a fashion
which would "displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions." 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976). The Court overruled National League of Cities
and abandoned its analysis of tenth amendment federalism in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). Justice Blackmun, the author of the Court's opinion in Garcia, later
noted the similarity between the Court's analysis under the tenth amendment in National League of
Cities and under the eleventh amendment:
Indeed, though of more mature vintage, the Court's Eleventh Amendment cases spring
From the same soil as the Tenth Amendment jurisprudence recently abandoned .. .
[in which] the Court, in derogation of otherwise unquestioned congressional power,
gave broad scope to circumscribed language by reference to principles of federalism
said to inform that language.
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3179 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
In Edelman v. Jordan, the Court applied an analysis similar to that of Employees in holding that
state participation in a federal welfare program did not constitute waiver of state immunity without
clear expression of congressional intent to abrogate state immunity. 415 U.S. at 673. When federal
imposition of suits on states approaches essential governmental functions of the states, the Court
has required clearer expression of congressional intent to subject the states to suit. See id. at 673.
Professors Fletcher, Nowak, and Tribe have examined the relationship of state immunity to more
general issues of federalism. See supra notes 297-310 and accompanying text.
3" 465 U.S. at 109 n.19, 112 n.22.
98
 Id. at 146 (Stevens. )., dissenting).
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however, consider the application of this doctrine in relation to the goals served by
sovereign immunity.
Rather than concentrate on abstract doctrines, the issues of sovereign immunity
involved when a state official is sued in federal court are better addressed by a two-part
inquiry. First, the Court must determine whether the state did in fact extend its immunity
to shield the official in this action. If the state did intend to extend its immunity, the
Court must still inquire whether the state may permissibly extend its immunity in this
fashion. The first question concentrates on whether the official's action was in fact
directed and protected by the state. The second question focuses on whether such an
extension of the state's immunity serves the purposes of that immunity, and whether
immunity can be extended to cover actions where federal law is involved.
C. Pendent Jurisdiction: A Prism for Unaddressed Underlying Issues
The Court in Pennhurst II held that broad state sovereign immunity was explicitly
required by the Constitution, and that pendent jurisdiction was a judge-made rule of
convenience."9 Therefore, the Court held that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in a
suit against a state official was impermissible. 54° The flaw in this holding is not in the
conclusion, but in the initial steps of the Court's analysis. The result in Pennhurst II was
forced by the Court's first steps of rooting broad state sovereign immunity in the
Constitution, and narrowly construing permissible suits against state officials.
As a result, this forced conclusion precludes consideration of the important policies
behind pendent jurisdiction. The Court in Pennhurst 11 applied an absolute bar, thus
supplanting the discretionary application of pendent jurisdiction. This is an unfortunate
result, because this discretionary device can serve important functions in some cases
while not doing violence to the important policies behind state sovereign immunity.
Pendent jurisdiction has several justifications. Some exercise of broader jurisdiction
is inferred from the "case or controversy" language of article 111. 341 In other cases,
pendent jurisdiction is employed to avoid unnecessary decision of constitutional issues. 342
Finally, where the state and federal claims have a "common nucleus of operative fact,"
pendent jurisdiction enables the entire litigation to be resolved in one tria1. 34'
The Court in Pennhurst II held that the bar of the eleventh amendment was not
limited to establishing article III jurisdiction in the first instanee. 344 Rejecting the argu-
ment that once article III jurisdiction is established the eleventh amendment bar is
raised, the Court held that each issue must independently satisfy the requirements of
the eleventh amendment. 345 In application, the Court's requirement that each issue satisfy
the eleventh amendment bar forecloses all application of pendent jurisdiction in suits
implicating the eleventh amendment. Pitting a constitutional "explicit limitation" against
a `Judge-made" rule of convenience yields an inexorable denial of the exercise of pendent
jurisdiction.
"9 Id. at 119-20,
949 Id, at 121.
94 ' See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
942 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville A.R., 213 U.S, 175, 193 (1909).
549 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
944 465 U.S. at 119-21.
995 id. at 121.
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The Court's categorical denial of pendent jurisdiction is the result of its merger of
governmental immunity with the limits federalism places on federal court power over
the states, and its constitutionalization of this broad state sovereign immunity."6 In
addition to deflecting consideration of the different bases for state immunity, the broad
bar imposed in Pennhurst II precludes consideration of the different kinds of cases in
which pendent jurisdiction arises and the different policies supporting the exercise of
pendent jurisdiction in a particular case. In certain cases, it may well be that exercise of
pendent jurisdiction might violate principles of federalism."' An absolute bar, however,
fails to address the underlying issues of federalism and the degrees involved in deciding
whether a suit is against a state or an individual official. The limitations on remedy" 8
reflect that the line between permissible and impermissible suits is not bright, but rather
one of degree, requiring further adjustment by tailoring remedies. An absolute bar
precludes consideration of those cases in which the pendent claim does not further
impinge on the state's autonomy. 349
The Pennhurst II Court's inflexible eleventh amendment holding precludes confront-
ing that the problems presented by cases such as Pennhursl go beyond the issue of state
sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment, and exemplify many of the prob-
lems inherent in public law litigation."° In the past thirty years, the federal courts have
546 See supra notes 263-311 and accompanying text.
347 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726-27 (1966) (state claims should be
dismissed without prejudice if state issues substantially predominate).
"g See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
349
 Another concern with the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in suits against state officials is
having federal courts deciding on the basis of unclear state law. The Court's holding in Pennhurst
II, however, only partially avoids this problem, and not by confronting the issue directly. The Court
must examine state law to decide whether an official acted within his authority. Pennhurst II, 465
U.S. at 112 n.22. Furthermore, the problem of unclear state law is presented in all cases involving
state law issues, and is not limited to suits against state officials. The Court's concern about deciding
unclear state law is better addressed in a systematic way, rather than piecemeal. See Brown, Beyond
Pennhurst — Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal
Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343, 360 (1985) (questioning Justice Powell's
failure in Pennhurst II to examine whether, given the requirements of Erie, federal court directives
based on state law issued to state officials are necessarily intrusive). The inflexibility of the Pennhurst
II Court's formulation of the state's interests is clear in Rogers v. Okin, 738 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1984),
in which the court of appeals certified questions of unclear state law to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. Id, at 3. Despite the detailed answers provided by the highest state court, the court
of appeals held that Pennhurst II barred federal courts from ordering state officials to comply with
state law. Id. The court of appeals noted the "irony" that the Supreme Court had previously
remanded the case, explicitly directing the court of appeals to consider state law grounds to avoid
reaching constitutional issues. Id. at 4. See also Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("the only error committed by the Court of Appeals was its faithful obedience to this Court's
command."). See infra notes 373-74 and accompanying text.
35° See generally Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term — Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Chayes, Public Law Litigation]; Chayes,
The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Chayes, The Role of the Judge]; Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and Judicial
Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution]; Frug,
The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1978); Johnson, The Role of the Federal Courts
in Institutional Litigation, 32 ALA. L. REV. 271 (1981); Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949 (1978); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1191
(1977). Cf. Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 465 (1980).
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become increasingly involved in litigation of great complexity concerning individuals
asserting rights over public institutions."' Fueled by the development of affirmative
injunctions 352 and class action suits, 353 and permitted in federal courts under the fiction
of Ex parte Young, 354 public law litigation has thrust the federal courts into an expanded
role in disputes over social policy and allocation of governmental resources. 355 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has restricted the role of the federal courts in public law
litigation. 356 The Court has limited the availability and effectiveness of federal courts in
public law litigation by expanding and rigorously applying doctrines such as standing
and federalism. 357 This trend restricting the role of federal courts has included the limits
imposed by the eleventh amendment. 358
The litigation over Pennhurst State School starkly exemplifies the complexity and
difficulties of public law litigation. Critics of public law litigation have used the Pennhurst
litigation as an example of the problems inherent in public law litigation. 359 The suit in
Pennhurst was a class action against a wide variety of public officials alleging violations
of individual rights. 560 The rights of mental patients have only recently been recognized
in the law, and resolution of the claims required the district court to construct a broad
remedial order and appoint a Special Master. 361 Finally, the care of the retarded was
traditionally a state function, 362 and the district court remedy was intrusive and costly.
In Pennhurst II, three grounds for review were briefed and presented to the Court, two
361 See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 350, at 5-6; Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution,
supra note 350, at 635; Frug, supra note 350, at 715.
352 See 0. Fiss, THE. CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 1-5 (1978); Weinberg, supra note 350, at 1201—
02.
353
 Fen, R. Civ. P. 23(6)(2), 23(b)(3) (1966).
354 See Griffin v. County School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 2 i8,228 (1964).
355 growth of public law litigation has engendered a debate over the proper role of the
federal courts. Supporters of the role of the federal courts in public law litigation have emphasized
the growth and complexity of the government and the need for the courts to expand their role
accordingly. See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 350, at 60; Johnson, supra note 350, at
272. Pointing to the important role federal courts play in protecting individual rights, and the
failure of public officials to resolve the issues raised by institutional lawsuits, these commentators
support an active federal role, See Chayes, Public Law Litigation, supra note 350, at 60; Johnson,
supra note 350, at 279.
Critics of the federal court role in public law litigation have noted the antimajoritarian nature
of the courts, see Frug, supra note 350, at 734-43; Mishkin, supra note 350, at 964-66; the institu-
tional incompetence of the courts in gathering all relevant data and reconciling competing claims,
see Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution, supra note 350, at 648-49; Mishkin, supra note 350, at 964-
66; the courts' insensitivity to the constraints of federalism, see Mishkin, supra note 350, at 967-71;
Frug, supra note '350, at 743-49; and the problems public law litigation poses to the legitimacy of
judicial power, see Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution, supra note 350, at 635; Frug, supra note 350,
at 733; Mishkin, supra note 350, at 950. See generally Note, Standing and Injunctions: The Demise of
Public Law Litigation and Other Effects of Lyons. 25 B.C.L. REV. 765 (1984).
956 See Brown, supra note 349, at 359-62; Weinberg, supra note 350, at 1203-05. See also supra
note 123.
337 See supra note 123 and cases cited therein.
356 See supra note 123 and cases cited therein.
"g See Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution, supra note 350, at 690-91; Frug, supra note 350, at
718 n.15.
36° See supra notes 136-48 and accompanying text.
36 ' See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text.
362 See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1973)
(noting care of the retarded is a traditional state function).
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of which directly concerned the propriety of the district court's remedial orders 363 In
Pennhurst I, the Supreme Court did not reach the remedial issue, holding only that the
federal statute conferred no substantive rights. 364 In Pennhurst II, the Court reached only
the eleventh amendment challenge. 36s
The Court's eleventh amendment holding permits federal courts to hear only federal
claims against state officials, within the narrow boundaries it has drawn for the fiction
of Ex parte Young. Plaintiff's are left, therefore, with the option of splitting their claims
between federal and state courts, or bringing suit in state court. 366 Plaintiffs are thus
denied a federal forum for their entire case, and cannot use the fact-finding capabilities
of the federal courts. 367
The Court's holding in Pennhurst II adopts an inflexible doctrine against which even
critics of public law litigation have cautioned. 366 The problems raised by public law
litigation require a more flexible analysis, especially where issues of federalism raised by
the interplay of state and federal law and the effective enforcement of constitutional
rights predominate. 369 Rather than address the problems of public law litigation directly,
the Court in Pennhurst II adopted the procrustean solution of forcing the litigation to fit
into a simpler form more in keeping with the Court's perception of a proper lawsuit. 376
365 Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 97. In addition to the eleventh amendment challenge, petitioners
argued that the doctrine of comity prohibited the federal court from issuing injunctive relief, and
that the district court abused its discretion in appointing special masters to supervise state officials.
Id.
364
 451 U.S. at 1 1.
363 465 U.S. at 97.
366
 If plaintiffs choose to bring their entire suit in state court, they may rely only upon a writ
of error to the Supreme Court, which can hear only a certain number of cases, to have federal
claims protected by the federal courts. See supra note 263-311 and accompanying text. Professor
Brown stated, "ft]he net result may be effectively to bar [multi-claim plaintiffs') entire case from
federal court by creating strong inducements to bring it in state court." Brown, supra note 349, at
365.
36: plaintiffs are forced to wait to appeal to the Supreme Court on a writ of error to a state
court judgment, plaintiffs would come to the Supreme Court "with the facts already found against
them. But the determination as to their rights turns almost wholly upon the facts to be found."
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 228 (1908) (per Holmes, J.). See also C. WRIGHT,
supra note 110, at 209 n.23.
363 See Fletcher, Discretionary Constitution, supra note 350, at 692-97; Frug, supra note 350, at
755-56.
The difficulty with relying on the eleventh amendment to bar direct federal court
mandates on the state treasury is that eleventh amendment prohibitions are absolute,
denying federal power to provide the remedy under any circumstances. Such rigidity
is a hindrance to adjusting the balance of federal-state power in constitutional cases.
It would be more sensible to distinguish permissible orders by the extent of their
financial burden or otherwise intrusive nature rather than on the basis of their form,
but eleventh amendment analysis does not permit the courts to do so.
Frug, supra note 350, at 755-56.
363
 "But the eleventh amendment and sovereign immunity are inappropriately blunt instru-
ments for dealing with these delicate matters." Shapiro, supra note 29, at 79.
373 See Brown, supra note 349, at 361.
In sum, the short shrift that the majority gave to the doctrines of pendent jurisdiction
is one of the puzzles of Pennhurst II. Perhaps the answer is to be found in the larger
context of the Current Court's reservations about institutional litigation . . . Pennhurst
II might thus be rationalized as another step in an overall process of making it harder
to bring such suits in federal courts.
Id. (citations omitted).
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The Court's haste to withdraw federal courts from involvement in public law litigation
is evident in its peremptory refusal to uphold relief against the defendant county officials,
to whom the eleventh amendment's protection does not extend."' By drastically reducing
the issues a federal court may hear and sharply limiting the remedies it may impose
under the fiction of Ex parte Young, the Court may have succeeded in removing the
federal courts from the realm of public law litigation."'
To achieve this result, the Court in Pennhurst 11 sacrificed an important precept of
constitutional adjudication — avoiding unnecessary constitutional decisions. This abso-
lute bar over hearing pendent state claims forces the federal courts to decide cases
brought before them on constitutional grounds, where that decision might otherwise be
unnecessary. The Court in Pennhurst 11 found this policy insufficiently compelling when
compared with its formulation of state sovereign immunity. 573 However, when state
sovereign immunity is considered with reference to what it protects rather than as an
abstract and absolute requirement, the discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction
may serve all of these goals. The exercise of pendent jurisdiction is, as the Court correctly
points out, 374 decided with reference to the principles of state immunity on each issue.
Those principles of state sovereign immunity ought not, however, amount to an absolute,
unconditional bar. Decided with reference to whether the state did extend its immunity
to cover the official's actions, and whether the state may so extend its immunity, the
discretionary exercise of pendent jurisdiction may avoid unnecessary constitutional de-
cisions, and serve the goals of efficiency and fairness to litigants.
CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the eleventh amendment has drifted far from its language
and historical purpose. The states' amenability to suit in the federal courts was debated
and not resolved as the Constitution was ratified. The history of eleventh amendment
interpretation, characterized by periods of dormancy followed by periods of renewed
interest, reflects the history of the relationships between the states and the federal
government. Applied within narrow confines for the first eighty years of its existence,
the eleventh amendment was extended in the post-Reconstruction era to grant states
immunity from suits on federal questions brought by their own citizens. Soon thereafter,
the doctrine was again modified in an exertion of federal judicial power over state
regulation of national industry. In recent years, the Court has shown renewed interest
in the eleventh amendment, and has increased the immunity granted to states.
In Pennhurst 11, the Court held that the eleventh amendment prohibits a federal
court from ordering a state official to conform his conduct to state law. 375 Holding that
the eleventh amendment constitutionalized a broad state sovereign immunity, the Court
restricted the few instances in which suits were allowed against state officials in federal
court. The Court's analysis of the eleventh amendment is not supported by the historical
"I See supra notes 215-18 and accompanying text. But see Shapiro, supra note 29, at 81 (Tribe
Court may be planning to rethink the whole question of the status of local government agencies.").
372 But see Brown, supra note 349, at 361 ("Yet it is unclear how much of a gain the decision
represents for those who oppose institutional litigation." Court failed to take "opportunity to cut
back on institutional litigation by providing remedial guidelines for the lower courts.").
373 See supra notes 207-14 and accompanying text.
374 465 U.S. at 121.
"5 Id. at 125.
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record, and indiscriminately blends distinct doctrines of governmental immunity and
federalism. The result is an abstract and inflexible doctrine which drastically restricts the
availability and effectiveness of a federal forum in public law litigation. The constant
adjustments and evolution of federalism and the demand for protection of individual
rights which has been the hallmark of modern constitutional law are not so easily cabined.
By stepping further from the foundation of state immunity in federalism, the Court
treats as immutable the dynamic principles of federal judicial power and individual
rights. Reconciling these vital principles is difficult, requiring close evaluation and ad-
justment by the courts. The Court in Pennhurst II instead closed the door to the federal
courts.
THOMAS W. BRIDGE
